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ABSTRACT

Tunisia has a large youth population; more than half of the population are youth aged
between 15-30 years in 2011. Tunisia has long faced challenges adopting serious reforms for
youth inclusion and participation. Young people, especially since the Arab Spring, are driving
social and economic innovation, challenging policies, and representing governments. More
connected than ever, young people exert a greater influence on their fellow citizens and their
country and youth inclusion is a central aspect of the post-2015 global development agenda.
This study seeks to determine the role of Civil society Organizations in youth inclusion by
drawing on extensive literature results as well as detailed qualitative research based on extensive
in-depth interviews and direct consultation with civically engaged young people, Civil society
Organizations, experts in the field, funds providers and public institutions officials. In addition to
a desk review that draws on the guidelines of youth involvement. This qualitative analysis is
combined with an overview of the international programs that improve youth empowerment.
Findings from this research and analysis form the basis of several proposals for new policies and
approaches specifically focused on youth in Tunisia. Interviews were conducted with
representatives from CSOs, young men and women who participated in governmental youth
initiatives and are currently working in public positions. Moreover, interviews were conducted
with civil society representatives and civically engaged youth after the uprising who shared their
insights on the issue of youth participation in public reforms and decision-making. The analyses
show noticeable regression in youth participation and progress initiatives aiming to meet their
requests. This analysis shows that there were various structural adjustments and laws passed to
better serve these youths’ interests and that is a promising indicator of the state's commitment to
youth. However, there is a need to expand the youth representation in these initiatives through
empowering civil society organizations and maintaining a comprehensive set of policies to
ensure the sustainability and effectiveness of these efforts and the re-establishment of trust
between youth and the public institutions.
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Chapter I: Setting the Frame
I.1. Introduction
In 2011, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region witnessed uprisings that led
to the withdrawal of the Tunisian and subsequently the Egyptian regimes, then later in that year,
the ruling regimes in Libya and Yemen (Hamanaka, 2016). These uprisings were initiated and
led by young people, civilians, and vulnerable groups of the societies and introduced a new way
of change and activism (Maganga, 2020). This is a new relationship between civil societies as
movable engines and critical drivers in facilitating and implementing well homogeneous
transitions. The experiences of Tunisia and Egypt feature prominently in the literature; in fact,
this topic is a central concern of both Middle Eastern and Western scholars (Sarmad, 2019).
The collapse of regime leaders during the so-called Arab Spring unlocked the window of
change in various MENA countries and called for a critical reconsideration of the public
development strategies and reforms (Barsoum, 2018). The empowerment among youth will only
occur if civil society (CS) , public institutions, and political leaders jointly grasp the cultural
bases of democracy and emerge in a fruitful dialogue (Kubicek, 2014). The emergent concerns
over the impact that does have on youth inclusion reforms led to calls for the active civil society
layers to push forward with their demands (Kubicek, 2014).
This main purpose of this study is to investigate the role of Civil society organizations
(CSOs) in youth inclusion reforms post-uprising Tunisia. Putting much focus on one side, with
less research on the tension between the ‘will’ of young people and expressing a ‘policy’
designed to target their needs, especially when this confronts the west’s security interests
(Tagma, 2013).
My central research question explores the role of young peoples’ civic power in the
enactment of youth inclusive reforms in Tunisia. The literature review part will take cases from
other countries such as Egypt that have similar experiences. Given that CSOs shaped the
synergistic dialogue between public institutions and active youth, they had a lot of contribution
to pushing government entities to adopt various adjustments serving the youth’s public interest.
According to these expectations, such interactions would result in greater structural reforms, an
enforcement of civil society’s role, and a less external domination in policy reforms (Sayed,
2020).
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The Arab awakening testifies to the magnitude of change that can be brought by the
mobilization of young people and how civic action can be used to carve out a public space that
had been forcibly kept in check by autocratic regimes (Center, 2013). It has been twelve years
since the uprising that was mainly led by Tunisian's active youth, whether in CSOs or
independently. The new Tunisian constitutional law of 2014 that emphasizes youth participation
as a key pillar of the social, economic, and political development of the country. Still, the youth
development index touched 0.59 ranking it 110th of 183 in the world (Haloues & Nahmeh, 2014).
Eventually, it showed a slight improvement in 2018, to an index of 0.739, bringing it to 91 of
183 in the world (UNDP, 2019).
Before the uprising, the number of CSOs who were involved in politics constituted the
majority. The sole goal of creating an NGO was to promote the image of the old regime such as
“BASMA” Association for the Promotion of Employment of the disabled is an NGO that was
founded by Tunisia's ex-First Lady" (Center, 2013; Civil society in Tunisia: from islands of
resistance to tides of political change , 2019). Civil society was purely allied with the
government with a huge difficulty of freely participating in a transparent manner and in a fully
respectful open environment without any ties or pressures. Right after the uprising, during a
climate of political division, young people came up with an informal and an indirect way of
political participation that rejects the traditional views of the political parties, which is civil
society activism (Center, 2013).
a. Problem statement
There is a new relationship between CSOs as movable engines and critical drivers in
facilitating and successfully implementing homogeneous transitions. After the uprising, there
was an influx of civil society organizations emerging not only in Tunisia, but also in the entire
Middle East and North Africa Region (Sika, 2018, 240).
Their role was pivotal in coordinating and connecting the welfare gaps by providing
services or alternative channels to their voiced need (Sika, 2018, 243). Thus, they did not have
centralized leadership nor centralized organization, as described by Bamyeh “they found
themselves relying on the ’clean part’ of the old regime to finish the revolution on their behalf”
(Bamyeh, 2016, 76). The ‘ Clean part’ are individuals who did not have any political engagement
and were not tied with the previous regime whether through political parties or individually. The
collapse of regime leaders during the so–called Arab Spring unlocked the window of change in

8

various MENA countries and called for a critical reconsideration of the public development
strategies and reforms (Barsoum, 2018).
In observing a young generation marked by many social and economic struggles where
civil society organizations are limited by institutions and reforms: we see a contrast in the
relationship between robust and active CSOs in creating tension between their will and the
necessity to design a strategy to target their needs. A study by USAID pointed out recently that
“72% of Tunisian CSOs do not believe that the current legal and structural framework either
does not provide for CSO participation in policy and legislative processes at the national level or
only partially provides for it” (USAID, 2018, 5). In addition, today, less than two-in-ten Tunisian
youth (17%) say they are still interested in politics, according to the fifth wave of the Arab
Barometer surveys (Tunisia: Youth Take a Stand for/against the President’s Decisions and
Watch in Limbo, 2022). Both studies state that there is little happening with youth engagement,
the question comes what needs to be improved or changed. After the uprisings, it became crucial
to relativize the concept of social involvement, re-define social contracts with public institutions,
and limit the donors-centric approach rather than simply improve our understanding of how civil
societies' activities and orientations could or could not impact and shape such reforms starting
from the institutions.
b. Study objectives
This study aims to shed light on the current perception of civically active youth in Tunisia,
their representative institutions, and their socio-political situation. The findings of this paper seek
to contribute to the increased understanding among policymakers and public institutions of the
issues faced by youth. It also seeks to strengthen the capacity of policymakers to formulate and
implement cross-sectoral policies that enhance the effective participation of youth in economic,
social, and political life. This paper aims to create an enhanced engagement between
policymakers and youth groups in jointly designing, reviewing, and implementing youth-based
policies for inclusive and sustainable development. The paper will focus on the unsteady
depoliticization and disenfranchisement of youth and on their experience of civil society
engagement as well.
After nearly 12 years post the uprising, formerly engaged youth have either taken jobs or left
the country. Thus, investigating this topic again will emphasize even more on its importance and
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on the unchanged scene despite the extensive research and reports written about this topic.
Moreover, despite having youth at the core of the revolution itself, there is no youth national
policy and youth inclusion is left as an unfinished project. “A multidimensional youth policy is
needed to reduce barriers to youth inclusion and facilitate youth contributions to Tunisian society
“ (World Bank, 2014). Recently, in 2016, new voices from civil society started calling out again
for the implementation of at least a National Youth Council. To accompany youth to overcome
the lack of a youth public policy. With the intervention of strategic CSOs, INGO partners, and
the government, the framework of discussion got set. Thus, despite the realized progress: “Real
work is just beginning. Participants are, now, committed to achieve an ambitious agenda”
(UNESCO, 2022).
The literature available regarding this research topic is outdated and limited. One of the
primary purposes of this study is to highlight the role of these civically engaged society groups
on youth inclusion reforms in Tunisia by understanding the challenges of having reforms serving
youth’s full inclusion to contribute to the social cycle. Based on the study’s results,
recommendations will be presented to highlight the role and importance of having an inclusive,
collaborative framework where CSOs, youth, public institutions, and the interactions with the
community of donors contribute to the preparation or more engagement among youth and to
facilitate their empowerment and development. The community of donors played a vital role in
sponsoring several local initiatives and projects. USAID reported in their research that the
primary sources of funding- as reported by the CSO stakeholders surveyed indicated that the
largest share of organizations are dependent on donations from individuals and foreign funders
(USAID, 2018, 36).
c. Research question
Based on the above-stated problem and research objectives, the research question
proposed for this thesis is:
“What is the Role of Civil society Organizations in Youth Inclusion Reforms in
Post-Uprising Tunisia?”
Through this qualitative research study, the study will investigate the role of CSOs in the
inclusion of youth in civic, political, and economic life through their empowerment.
Furthermore, it will also assess the effectiveness of their role and of the community of donors’
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discourses in shaping those patterns. The research question takes cases from Egypt in the
literature review section to what they have or similar in their experiences given that civil society
shaped the synergistic dialogue between public institutions and active youth.
The research question sheds some light on the influence of the forces that civically
engaged youth channels through CSOs in shaping Youth Empowerment Reforms. From one side,
the direct interactions that CSOs have with youth rehabilitate these reforms via the public
institutions' legacy. On another side, the maturity of the discourse of CSOs drives youth to
request more pointed reforms and to have a stricter implementation. The variable ties between
CSOs and active citizens, specifically youth, are playing an intermediate role in connecting their
different visions and aspirations to institutions. Civil society- as a container for youth, can
develop and provide them with new experiences and influence the formal elements to achieve a
balance of power.
Accordingly, this main theme includes. Sub research questions to establish a wellstructured analysis as per the following questions:
1.

What are the discourse institutions and the challenges faced: internally, externally, and on
the implementation level of real, tactical reforms.?

2.

How can youth get to effectively participate in their inclusion?

3.

To what extent civil society objectives are being met and on how progress activities can
better meet the requests of youth during this period in the history of the region and under
this international structural guidance?

4.

What is the CSOs contribution in pushing government entities to adopt various structural
adjustments serving the public interest?

5.

How is the general situation of active youth in Tunisia in relation to participation in
decision making and their motives behind their involvement in civil society?
Researching this question gave me a considerable understanding of the role of CSOs in

the civil society scene whether in connection with the youth demands, the public institutional
framework, or the community of donors’ discourses. The analyses of the research findings is
more or less similar to the literature review findings, thus, some new findings and gaps were
found, emphasizing the need to have a better understanding and review of this topic.
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I.2. Conceptual framework
Based on the findings in the literature review, the following conceptual framework was
used to help us better understand the coordinated mechanisms.
The conceptual framework (CF) illustrated in Fig 1 will focus on the important terminologies
that will be at the center of the research study and establish a link between civil society
organizations formed by engaged youth as an intermediate key player term and a potent
emergent agent of change. A big umbrella called civil society where youth and CSOs are key
components. The conceptualization will highlight simultaneously the interactions with the public
institutions as a pivotal element.

Fig 1: Conceptual Framework
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Source: Author’s compilation based on (Volpi, 2015; Pierre Tainturier, 2016; Belschner, 2021)

a. Conceptualizing youth and their inclusion
Actively engaged youth are a key player in the CF. They are well included in civil
society, they do have direct and indirect interactions with CSOs in a way to transmit their needs,
aspirations, doubts, and concerns. Through their activities, CSOs mutually interact offering a
space to receive and mobilize this mass of active youth through their own channels and
discourses playing a mediator role. Their involvement in CSOs must be questioned as an
enabling factor towards political, social, and economic inclusion. Their activism and
participation is, albeit, seen as a core principle and an objective that ought to drive policies
dedicated to youth, from grassroots to national networks (Tainturier, 2016).
On the other hand, these youth are in light bilateral communication with their public
institutions only since there is no national policy1 for them (Factsheet Tunisia, 2014). Losing

1

https://www.youthpolicy.org/factsheets/country/tunisia/
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what is left of their ties with the official public structures representing them despite the
opportunities offered. These opportunities are coupled with challenges and several limitations.
These challenges transform youth’s concerns into more forms of more needs, frustration and
regrets. Both dynamics with the public institutions and with CSOs present external challenges to
their own inclusion process creating pressure and a turbulent environment.
In that ecosystem, another external component emerges which is the community of donors. This
component does not have linked ties with youth but work mainly with public institutions and
with CSOs to give support. This sponsorship is coupled with certain challenges and has been
offered with certain patterns.
b. Conceptualizing CSOs
The uprising offered CSOs a great extent of freedom to participate in social life and to
have a safe space where they can feel empowered and showcase their capabilities. Thus,
challenges coming from delays in the forms of long- hectic administrative paperwork, formal
and rigid bureaucracy, and the lack of collaboration were hindering and dispersing their efforts.
The three parts in the CF are mutually interacting to ensure youth inclusion on various levels.
CSOs became a strong player in translating and linking youth’s aspirations with their specific
discourses on ideas and mobilization to facilitate youth emergence in public life through
containing their hopes and voices.
CSOs had a lot of contribution in pushing government entities to adopt various structural
adjustments serving youth’s public interest. According to these expectations, such interactions
would result in greater structural reforms, an enforcement of civil society’s role, and a less
external domination in the policy reforms orientations (Sayed, 2020). Barsoum (2016)
emphasized on that by outlining a positive relationship between the popularity of a citizen
proposal and its likelihood of becoming and passing as a constitutional provision reflecting the
role of public concerns and pressure on the Tunisian constitution yet a formal youth national
policy is not present so far Since 2013, there is no youth national policy and the implementation
is by the Ministry of Youth, Sports, Women and Families.
Post 2011 Uprising had the emergence of a new category of actively engaged groups that
could be classified into three big groups:
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-

1) Informal networks, leaderless, horizontal, and spontaneous youth
organizations: These CSOs were not created as a product of a formal process.
They are not the result of any formal political groups, are not ideologically or
religiously uniform, but have rather different worldviews and priorities including
community based and faith-based organizations.

-

2) Unconventional Online participation Avenues: mainly based on ‘virtual
activism’ forming ‘virtual communities’, active online and working on a large
network of virtual engagement. They label themselves as CSOs as well.

-

3) Formally structured CSOs who are influenced to a certain degree with the
political situation.

c. Conceptualizing donors’ community
The donors community is also a key player in the ecosystem to their contribution and
reinforcement of various CSOs through their funding and capacity building programs. They are
acting to strengthen the value of information sharing, project implementation, and have a big role
in financially supporting institutional plans (Barsoum, 2016). Through their activities, the public
institutions of Tunisia will be able to heighten collaboration between institutions and citizens
while improving the social cohesion and helping to create a more inclusive society, better
integrated for youth.

15

Chapters II: Youth Inclusion; an Objective or a Project
II.1. Key challenges for youth inclusion
This section coming before the findings to give more context about the concept of youth
inclusion in general. It will also help contextualizing civil society in Tunisia. It will set the
context frame and the background of youth and their inclusion in Tunisia. Contrasting it between
being an objective hard or possible to reach their full immersion and in between having it as a
pre tailored project, already set but the development partners. This section will shed light on the
different fluctuations in perception when we talk about youth inclusion in general. The themes
covered varies from the handpicking and the selective inclusion, the fragility of the relationships
between the different ecosystem components.
a. Inclusion and exclusion of youth
The uprisings were a considerable opportunity in at least generating a stable flow of
policy reforms that are based on the idea of individuals governing themselves (Hatit, 2013;
Cordova, 2019, pp.337-335). This rhetorical renaissance of civil society organizations was put at
the renewed policies of development for the European Union (EU) vis a vis its southern
neighbors (OECD, 2017). These policies were already executed by the dictatorial regimes who
handpicked the class to benefit from the promoted strategies and usually were crafted for them.
After the revolutions, policies have established alternative ties to support local elites. In
his article, Mustafa Tagma (2013) highlighted a ‘bottom-up’ empowerment approach adopted by
focusing on CSOs, division of labor, movement of capital, and individual-level penetration.
Barsoum (2018) revealed that these programs are usually under-funded with outdated
service replicas and design flaws. Tainturier (2016) conducted ethnographic research and
interviewed several local CSOs in Tunisia from the south. His study findings revealed that
benefitting from these international programs and getting funds is not sufficient to assume that
these youth led organizations to be fully included institutionally and to fully build their capacity.
İşleyen (2014) compared Tunisia and Egypt's institutional reforms policies. Joint capacity
building projects picture citizens as a resource to be employed to realize individual and societal
development. These projects by the EU aim at responding to the local needs and intimately to
adapt to them in their projects. In the analyses, the researcher highlights the technical language
coming with such projects. The selection, execution, and evaluation contribute to the one size
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fitting all. There are differences in the objectives and unquestioned linkage between how realistic
and inclusive these projects are to everyone.
In their qualitative studies, Meddeb (2017; Súilleabháin Y. M., 2020) highlighted the
mistrust that the youth from East and West cities and provinces have in terms of regional
equality under the previous regime. Aftermath of the Tunisian revolution, youth’s expectations
for the state to eliminate these disparities were raised. Vopli (2016) described the behavior of
citizens themselves after the uprising as “challenging the rules and taking the law into their own
hands” (Volpi, Local (R)evolutions in Tunisia: Reconstructing Municipal Political Authority,
2016). That generated a different reaction from the institutions that were suffering for decades
from filthy practices amid the lack of the infrastructure and environmental set. Describing the
consequences of this, Volpi, (2016) quoted:
.. Created frictions that undermined the efficiency of the new system. Citizens who had
expected a rapid change in their material condition were disappointed by what they saw
generically as “bad” governance (Volpi, Local (R)evolutions in Tunisia: Reconstructing
Municipal Political Authority, 2016).
Cordova (2019) highlighted the causal link between the inability of institutions to
involve, to contain youth in the policy dialogue, and the inability of the new and old elites- high
class of politicians to safely manage a democratic political post-revolutionary transition. That
produced an ambiguous outcome, away from the democratic substantial reforms needed. This
division in the Tunisian society whether on the political, class, and social level heated political
debates from the public proposals received (Maboudi, 2020). Koyro (2014) argued that these
exchange interactions between youth and institutions failed due to the inability of youth to
formalize and to translate their networks and needs in a solid format to base their selfconsciousness into longer term, sustainable organizations that can channel their concepts of
citizenship.
b. Between trust and fragility
Scholars e.g. (Mansouri, 2020; Abdelrahman, 2013; Zemni, 2015) broke down the
influencing factors of CSOs via- a vis the policies and youth themselves. The findings
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highlighted the negative impact and proportional relationship between the current governance
opposition faced and the fragility of their own stand.
Mansouri (2020) explained these relationships in his research. Youth resigned from
political activities as their trust in officials and institutions abated. Consequently, the level of
trust declined in the political class and generally in the democratic path. Their different case
studies carried on throughout Tunisia and Egypt showed a general unsolid background and a
general struggle to make sense of the fresh electoral setting. The minimal or no communication
between political elites and the public, especially among youths, has increased political distrust
(Zemni, 2015; Mansouri, 2020; Abdelrahman, 2013; Boukhars, 2015).
This fragility and unsecurity in engaging with the political class and with public
institutions equally was counter balanced by various trials to include youth in the reformal
process, emancipation programs through institutional initiatives, and open discussions with the
public. Zemni (2015) identified the contributive efforts of the government to ensure that political
institutions remain on the top of the general process’ continuity. This process is considered
exclusive by and to youth, vulnerable groups, and active units. Hence, the United Nations (UN)
conducted a survey over the Arab region’s countries measuring the degree of youth’s
involvement in decision-making processes. The results showed that most of the youth voted for
not having enough real, inclusive opportunities vis-versa not having enough trust in the
governmental entities to effectively listen to their voices. At the same time, the report
specifically mentioned that youth give much more credibility to organizations than to any
political figure (United Nations Inter-Agency Network, 2013).
Meddeb (2017) explained this tendency of youth to give more credibility to CSOs rather
than to their elected institutional representatives. In his research on how Tunisia benefited from
the support of the international programs offered by the European Union; the research showed
that governors tend to favor certain sectors over the development one in a worry about their
career and that is why they tend to favor one project over the other. Sayed (2020) further
elaborated other reasons for the failure of institutions to meet youth’s needs, attributing it to the
fragility of state institutions and the lack of adequate skills and infrastructure in both the civil
society and the institutions themselves. Sayed described these relationships as fluctuating
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between ‘society- centered’ forms - where civil society has a powerful stand over institutions.
And in between ‘institutions- centered’ forms - where the leadership have an upper hand and an
influential status creating a complex dynamic leading to no effective plans (2020).
Abdelrahman (2013; Zemni, 2015) investigated this vertical, authoritarian relationship by
studying the Tunisian and the Egyptian contexts simultaneously in a comparative case. Their
studies commonly justified the deep division in their organizational structures making them easy
to manipulate and to take over. The council’s limited legitimacy along with their limited
resources and co-facilitated the slow path of making decisions and of acting in the local
administration (Volpi, 2016). As he mentioned “The councils’ limited legitimacy combined with
their limited resources and support from the state administration ensured that local political
actors were often unable or unwilling to act decisively in the face of conflicting social demands”
(Volpi, Local (R)evolutions in Tunisia: Reconstructing Municipal Political Authority, 2016).
Kubicek (2014; Fethi, 2020, Meddeb, 2017) highlighted other explanatory factors to this
division and lack of unification such as regional disparities, class divisions, and elites' apparition.
Equally, Tainturier explained this through methodical intimidations and authoritarianism of the
expelled as the process of emancipation did not involve only youth (2016). Elders also took part
of the marches whether formally or informally bringing another generational perspective to their
demands: “NGOs creation was not only in the hands of seniors since some of the young rioters
set out to organize themselves by using formal means “(Tainturier, 2016). In evaluating the
absenteeism of institutions in conversations with the CSOs in Egypt and Tunisia, Abdelrahman
(2013) highlighted that it is a mutual approach. CSOs, on the other hand, carried on the absence
of a formal organizational body to be a potent assembling key point and wanted only to have the
voice for them.
İşleyen (2015; Mansouri, 2020) assessed the capabilities of the public institutions in the
post-revolutionary countries. They emphasized on the fragile structure of the technical
regulations, hampering the growth prospects. In addition, the scarcity in institutional skills and
unsatisfactory performance led to the creation of barriers to competition in regional and
international manners and most importantly internally. Institutions became too weak to enforce
any central decision of even taking the initiative to implement or propose suggestions to the
central government (Hamza, 2017).
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Kubicek (2013) studied the general framework that worked as an alternative of the
political parties for a more sustainable and stable relationship between youth and their
represented institutions. Revolutions were spontaneous and not the result of a formal transitory
election process. Kubicek analyses the case of Tunisia and Egypt– like the other countries of the
MENA region do not share the same economic and social features for that building and shifting
public institutions’ orientations to purely ‘from scratch’ is a process that opens a risky creation of
new authoritarian governments and the periphery regions.
Abdelrahman (2013) analyzed donors’ discourses on the Egyptian active society, and its
ongoing process of transformation, the challenge of neutrality was at the core when selecting
beneficiaries. In her case studies, the sampled groups were outside formal political institutions,
and independently active trying to renegotiate state power. Thus, her research concluded that
these CSOs ended up becoming active in the political sphere hampering the trust discourses and
the confidence between partners due to the old regime compromising practices.
II.2. Priority areas and global narratives
a. Inefficient efforts
Meddeb (2020) described the EU's interest in the two first revolutionary examples as not
new and donors have always been supporting twinning both countries. Tunisia specifically had
no other case in terms of support received from international partners since the uprising and the
flow of donations was satisfying: “money is not the problem” (Meddeb, 2017). Despite being
recipients of generous donations and capital flows from international financial institutions such
as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, there are no tightened coordination
mechanisms between the international partners (Meddeb, 2020).
Volpi (2015) however argued in his research that this flow of resources of money will be
diminishing as soon as less foreign donors will be interested in providing funds and that CSOs
will face being left without a budget. These issues with the funding are reflagged more and more
and so some CSOs are creating unsustainable habits in budget spending which are accused of
being unequally distributed (Volpi, Political developments in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia,
2015). Many organizations will cease to operate without the lack of funds, and this is perceived
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as a positive move as it will ‘filter’ the market from ‘inefficient’ CSO members perceived as
talkative rather than active (Volpi, 2015).
b. Communication gap
Halit Mustafa Tagma (2013) underlined that the new institution-building policies should
encourage inclusive economic growth and development. They should be unbuilt upon agreed
policy objectives that meet the mutual aspirations and serve countries’ interests. Hence,
highlights the existing gap between the policy vision and the local expectations and needswhen adapted to local contexts.
Barsoum (2018; Volpi, 2016; Koyro, 2014) highlighted the double standards approach in
discourse mandating. Exemplary by Volpi is Füle’s speech to the European Parliament given in
2011 addressing the unmatching between their alignment with the old oppressive regimes
without a real implementation of development efforts (2016):
We must show humility about the past. Europe was not vocal enough in defending human
rights and local democratic forces in the region. Too many of us fell prey to the
assumption that authoritarian regimes were a guarantee of stability in the region (Füle,
2011)
This difference in the visions and needs is also prominent as a generational gap. The
elders who are having the power in their hands, are slower and love bureaucracy (Tainturier,
2016).
c. Pre-tailored norms
Meddeb (2017) labeled this surge in discourses as a deep mea culpa in the history of the
EU and the general community of donors. As a result, the EU vowed to revisit its bottom-up
approach and impose prêt-à-porter solutions. In their comparative case between the Moroccan
and the Tunisian EU involvement, Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt (2021) found that there are
differences in policy areas that EU are, were, and will be supporting. Policies fitting the so called
‘right type of norms’ that:
Deliver and align with their perception and strategy for civil society organizations and
inputs in the regional level as expressed’ a desire to make civil society organizations
more able implementers of EU projects (Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt, 2021)
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These projects and streams of funds analyses showed that these projects seemed to be
providing more of a ‘shopping lists’ in lieu of well-defined and budgeted strategies till today
Meddeb (2020). The role of elites, interest groups, media, and civil society organizations in the
process of constitutional bargain is undeniable Maboudi (2020). Comparing with the old
regime’s practices, Koyro ‘s qualitative study explained how previously the old regime was
working with selected CSOs who had certain capacities of budget proposals and those CSOs
were the ones benefiting from secured funds from the EU (2014). Smaller and less
professionalized groups like the ones in rural areas struggled to meet those bureaucratic
conditions, thus hindered from any access to funds and to expand locally.
Kubicek (2013) addressed also in their research the EU’s shift in narratives and strategies
opened a new chapter far more engaged with promoting democratization than when it cooperated
with the authoritarian regimes. Hence, the EU efforts are still looked down on and even seen as
inadequate by the civil society actor focus, promoting concepts such as ‘civic virtue’, and critical
‘consciences’, ‘youth civic engagement’(Meijer, 2015). Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt (2021)
analyzes the EU justification to this by the existing imbalance between the needs and wants.
They develop more on the donors’ passive attitude while listening to civil society concerns.
Drawing upon the studies of consulting firms which end up uncritically being perceived
supporting the EU donor’s strategy rather than providing objective analysis.
Koyro (2014) contrasts the orientation of the EU politics on CSOs and on fostering their
cooperation, with how they are still repeatedly state – centered where the implementation of the
programs was exclusively, co- ownership and closely monitored by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation and closely monitored by the Ministry of the Interior.
Development agencies discourses was impactful in democracy promotion efforts of the in
Tunisia and Morocco. The tendency of including the civil society actors is becoming a
‘BuzzWord’ from the EU participants in recent years. Ragnar Weilandt (2021; Hamza Meddeb,
2017) emphasized the Tunisia case where civil society is seen as an ally to democratic transition.
This inclusion is often conducted also through a more personal relationship between the donor’s
representatives and activists in informal interactions.
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OECD (2017) reported that cooperating with Tunisian institutions including with civil
society group to work with and to support. This preference from the EU donors to prefer statecentered cooperation was described as a cause of mistrust among CSOs. Tunisia played a major
role in the region that Europe should grasp its economy and social dynamics for long-term
stability. Mansouri (2020) illustrated this trust as a “in key political institutions is vital in any
democracy, a nascent one, as trust is a key condition for bolstering the legitimacy of a
democratic regime, even if it is faced with challenges” (Mansouri, 2020).
In their description of the relationship between the civil society and youth inclusion in
citizenship life, Khakee & Weilandt echoed the strong stress of the European donors on
involving the Tunisian civil society in the matters they are concerned about and even on the
larger negotiations (2021). Thus, these negotiations and ‘consultations’ from the government
side and the donors are usually considered ‘window-dressing’ by the civil society actors involved
due to their strong force in mobilizing youth. In his interviews with some activists as well as
negotiators from the donors’ community (Khakee & Weilandt, 2021).
Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt (2021) described the EU presence in the form of
gatherings in meetings format where representatives from the donor’s community explaining to
activists and CSOs what they intend to do and their projects in general without a genuine
openness to their concerns and feedbacks in a ‘one size fits all’ approach and ‘info session’
format.
Contrarily to that, Ragnar Weilandt (2021) described in his qualitative study these
gatherings as being very critical to understand the nature of the ecosystem as these local CSOs
have stronger ties with the people and Tunisian matters. Developing on that, Mathieu Rousselin
(2017) stated that EU delegations are usually misunderstood or misrepresented causing high
mistrust and concerns like patronizing and patterning.
Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt (2021) diagnosed the implications of this shift in
global narratives and its impact on the CSOs industry, creating more job opportunities for young
talented youth from different areas. This, by instituting the NGO industry, turned the sphere from
a strong resistance where the street had a strong voice, to a reasonable, salaried, nine to five job
rather than a true challenge to the system and its bodies.
(Tainturier, 2016) analyses of the regional case studies highlighted the results of this
orientation. Making civil society depolarized and limited to implementing only the agendas and
preferences of donor states and organizations. Turning civic engagement from idealist calling
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into an attractive career path. The involvement in civic life equipped these organizations with the
know-how skills through volunteering giving them more legitimacy which they take in a
prestigious way leveraging up their identity.
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Chapter III. Literature Review
The primary read of the relevant literature related to the topic of this thesis was made to
have an initial understanding of the context of the theme, and to create a basic knowledge base
that would contribute to facilitating and supporting the discussion and the further analyses. The
researcher had a preliminary overview of the topic covered in the literature related to youth
inclusion and the role of actively engaged youth in civil society organizations, their participation
in translating their aspirations within the institutional framework, youth empowerment, youth
participation, youth organizations, youth policies, the regional discourse of the community of
donors and the International Organizations’ role.
The literature reviewed for this research is divided into three thematic sections where
civil society organizations (CSOs) are playing a pivotal role in: Profiling youth- civil society
organizations' dependence relationship, institutionalizing youth aspirations, and
international community of donor’s discourses. The section on youth profiling- CSOs
dependence relationship details the different components of this reliance connection. A general
definition of actively engaged youth in the regional context and in the local one, followed up by
a definition of institutional reforms and Inclusion, and lastly of CSOs. The section will also study
the perception of youth whether a challenge or an opportunity, and what are their needs. A third
part will investigate the role of CSOs’ as a translator of these demands.
The second part on institutionalizing youth aspirations discusses literature on assessing
the public institutions' capacities, the CSOs and youth–state relationship, and the challenges
faced in the translation of these youth priorities. By outlining the general framework of youth
inclusion in Tunisia as the main case and to a lesser extent in other countries of the Middle East
and North Africa region. This part will also highlight some of the major efforts and contributions
to institutionalize these demands at the local Tunisian level.
The last part will be discussing the role of international organizations in affecting the
reform process, their role in the establishment of the mechanism or the institutional framework
that supports the inclusion of youth aspirations in the national public policy process, and the
challenges faced. And lastly, how these discourses are shaping in one way or the other the efforts
to include youth.
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The literature was analyzed chronologically. The existing literature prior to the uprising
till recently- end of 2019. The time frame of the literature review was conducted for over a year.
The literature covered a wide range of journal articles, political reports, and books from online
and offline sources (libraries, governmental websites, CSOs, networks, and governmental
institutions- mainly the ministry of youth and labor).
III.1. Civil society and youth
III.1.1. Actively engaged youth, CSOs, and institution’s definitions
a. Civil society and actively engaged youth definition
After the wave of demonstrations in the Middle East and North Africa region,
there was a renewed attention of academics, policy makers, and media outlets on the importance
of reforming the Public Social Reforms to be more inclusive for youth (Barsoum, 2016;
Belschner, 2021, p. 7; Koyro, 2014, p. 35). That includes the emergence of civil society
organizations as a strong partner in challenging the narratives and in pushing towards reformist
changes.
Civil society is defined per the United Nations (UN) as the third sector of society, along
with government and business entities comprising civil society organizations and nongovernmental organizations (United Nations, 2019). It is formed by citizens who deliberately
have chosen to join informal interaction groups in a non-institutionalized or political way with
public institutions or working in the ecosystem aiming to bring change to the existing structures
through mobilization to withstand authoritarian upgrading (Koyro, 2014).
In the Tunisian context, Volpi (2015; Affan, 2021, 3) presented another definition of
CSOs through their role historically as an active mass of power:
Either a state-constrained entity or an outlawed vehicle of opposition. Despite heavy cooption of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and Association Tunisienne des
Femmes Démocrates (ATFD), groups such as the Tunisian Forum of Economic and
Social Rights (FTDES) stayed militant and underground. This is not to say that they were
ineffective. Tunisia has an historical tradition of activism and political engagement that
predates and proceeded throughout Ben Ali’s reign where institutions such as the
Tunisian National Lawyers Order (ONAT) has a track record of resistance to
unfavorable government policy. This pre-existing legacy of organized non-governmental
grouping helped enable effective and coordinated civic action in the uprisings.
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Furthermore, these pre-existing civil traditions have facilitated the rapid development of
the new post-revolutionary civil society (Volpi et al. 2015, p. 23).
Bauer (2015) contrarily emphasized that the role that civil society plays is more of a
hamper rather than a booster of positive change in the MENA context. More specifically, he
identified the role of CSOs as a subtle and observable secondary one rather than a changemaker
(Bauer, 2015). Opposed to other scholars, in defining the role of civil society, Tainturier (2016)
described the civic engagement through NGOs as an empowering process. Aiming for better
economic and social inclusion rather than to challenge power and domination structures.
Fethi (2020; Koyro, 2014) conducted different comparative case studies between the
Arab World and related his results to the Tunisian context. Focusing on the post-uprising era,
their research respectively showed that, in massive social movements, it is not only the CSOs
who were the ones ahead, nor were they the leaders of changes. In these social movements,
active youth and the hard-to-reach ones were prominently present. Hence, not under the umbrella
of an organization rather than in personal capacity, individually representing their demands.
The common expectation in the Arab world is that CSOs with their civically engaged youth, and
political actors to be the ones leading the uprisings. The perception of individual civically
engaged youth as ‘sub-citizens’ explicates their demands for ‘dignity’ during the Arab Springs’
demonstrations.
Cavatorta explained this emergence of a new category leading the social transformation
in Tunisia. The rise of new civil society actors that see themselves as part of a movement rather
than a particular organization. Youth activists, female campaigners for women’s rights, as well
as individuals engaged in the protests utilized the internet, and in particular social media sites, to
encourage change in Tunisia (2012).
In describing the motives of CSOs to be active, Volpi (2015) stated that they are not
trying to win power despite their support for the political deadlock. He analyzes the case of
Tunisia back 2015 when the four largest and oldest CSOs: the Tunisian Human Rights League
(LTDH), ONAT, the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts (UTICA) and UGTT,
collectively also known as the ‘The Quartet’, played a vital role in overcoming this deadlock by
establishing a national dialogue that happened in Tunisia after the associations. The role of civil
society is important in mobilizing the masses of youth. But a politicized civil society is
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problematic as they should be separate from political parties (Volpi, Political developments in
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, 2015).
b. Institutions and inclusion definitions
This section will investigate the definition of public institutions, the inclusion process of
public policy, and the importance of youth participation in the public policy processes. Trying to
oversee youth affairs “some countries organize youth right at the center of their government,
others have a youth ministry; some have a department for youth affairs within another Ministry”
(OECD, 2018, p. 12). Albeit, interpreting the global numbers; there is a noticeable lag in the
participation of young people in the formal, institutional political processes in the region (United
Nations Inter-Agency Network, 2013, p. 1)
Mansouri (2020) found that public institutions play a double role. As main generators of
youth inclusion reforms and implementers of these reforms. The implementation process requires
the involvement of other entities. Mansouri highlights that this has been a challenge in the
Tunisian case despite the high level of involvement of the CSOs and the civil society in general
due to the lack of real dedicated mechanisms eager to change.
Tainturier (2016) investigated the youth inclusion framework through CSOs and defined
institutional inclusion as a form of legitimization process of the NGOs from their creation
following the process of their development in the field of CSOs, State, and international donors.
In Tunisia, Chograni (2021) identified a failure for Tunisians even after 10 years since
the revolution to activate translating their requests from protesting to exercising their active
citizenship and the enthusiasm that the Arab Spring generated in its early days has now been
evaporating slowly.
Public institutions remained powerless and lack agency as examined: “Political
participation for the youth is considered to be less a matter of political party affiliation and more
of a struggle for change through CSO activities and volunteer work, using street protests and
social media to effect social change” (Mansouri, Youth and political engagement in postrevolution Tunisia, 2020, p. 7).
Volpi (2015) described the dreams of having democratization moving away from
autocratic governments to embrace liberty turning into a nightmare of internal strife, social and
sectarian divisions.
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c. Youth and reforms definition
Youth are redirecting their voices away from the formal political process towards more
local social activism. In analyzing the motives behind this shift, Chograni (2021) emphasized on
the lack of real youth-targeted programs, the political alienation based on the old regime’s
practices, and the general disillusionment from mainstream party politics created this new
tendency of youth to pursue political ways outside the traditional sphere of political participation
by leading CSOs.
Mansouri (2020) described this shift to be negatively impacting the engagement with
political institutions and the political processes. The elections and the implementation of the
mandates. The term youth will be defined respectively by looking into the local contexts of
Tunisia as the main case study and then to a lesser extent from Egypt in the second section. In
Tunisia, and according to a youth policy study by EuroMed, Tunisian youths are those aged 1529 (Sylvie Floris, 2014) and the same definition was used in the Egyptian state, per CAPMAS
definition (Pierre Tainturier, 2016).
Reforms are the set of programs and strategies implemented by the institutional
authorities with the aim of providing opportunities and support in the integration and inclusion
into the society by empowering youth’s active citizenships as agents of change (OECD, 2021;
Francesco Cavatorta, 2012). In our context, youth is loomed in a more socially constructed way
rather than from a demographic age frame. As defined by Mansouri in his paper:
Even this fluid characterization of youth may not reflect the prolonged period of
dependence that often goes well beyond the age of 25, as young people struggle to enter
the labor market and gain independence. This period of ‘waithood’, describes young
people who have passed the age of 24 but have not yet been able to attain the social
markers of adulthood, such as forming families and households, due to financial
constraints linked to unemployment (Mansouri, 2020)
In another definition brought up by Meijer (2015), reforms are instruments “bringing
about the virtuous circle of citizenship and achieving a new social contract that is the basis of
accountability and democracy, but also of stability and security” (Meijer, 2015). The main role
of these reforms can be directed to change and boost the political, economic, and social systems
replacing all the tribalism, authoritarianism, and sectarian divisions. Creating a system based on
citizenship rights and duties. The author focused on the Tunisian case and how after the uprising
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many of these reforms were not implemented, sometimes reversed, left split amid the social and
political divisions. These reforms are boosters for youth inclusion to actively engage in civic life
(Meijer, 2015).
In this study, the term inclusion will be mostly derived from empowerment and its
relatives as it has progressively been evolving. On a general scope of definition, Tainturier,
described inclusion’s goal as: “To designate individual capacities to better act within a given
system and has become embedded in the institutional order of development” (Pierre Tainturier,
2016).
United Nations (2009) defined inclusion as emancipation, which, as a search for equality.
Interpreting that, civic society participation reinforces active citizenship and promotes a more
integral and inclusive social system. The measurement of youth inclusion is performed through
the assessment of their development and empowerment. As per the UN Sustainable Development
Goals indicators there are 68 indicator providing information, directly or clearly, relevant to
youth development (DESA, UN).
Koyro (2014) stressed on the international community’s role especially the European
Union (EU) in reshaping these trajectories by not limiting their support to only financial means
rather than offering a space for training on basic skills such as management, budgeting,
fundraising etc. Otherwise, the new instruments will lack the ability to sustain or to offer the
required impact esteemed by the European civil society Cooperation.
III.1.2. Youth inclusion today
In his comparative case of Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco analyzing the social agents of
change, (Volpi, 2015) highlighted that the social mobilization in these countries should not be
read as anti-regime for calling out for reforms that are absent since ages. Neither as against the
state. Contrarily, he perceives it as a form of confronting radicalism of the state institutions even
if these three countries took different trajectories.
The emergence of CSOs as mobilizers is not in this context perceived as a counter-power
for redefining the state balance or to take the state’s power. The qualitative study of Volpi (2015)
showed that, in contrast, these youth movements are stimulated with the demand to have stronger
and greater relationships with the state and society, to be more responsive to what society needs
and aspires for.
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Belschner (2021) focused their argument on granting youth more freedom to be included
in the various aspects of civic life is crucial for their inclusion. Thus, in their research, they
argued that this representation should be also contained in a broad way to the disadvantageous
youth category as the main moderator and active agents sparkling the revolutions (Belschner,
The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings, 2021). That led to the expansion of new
waves of civic networks and grassroots organizations from charities to development ones led by
these dedicated youth (Pierre Tainturier, 2016).
Thus, the perception of youth and of their active involvement had another side facet. The
research of Tainturier, (2016) showed these youth have an immense power which can be turned
out and manipulated. (Belschner, 2021) expressed a similar argument in her research, quoting
one of the interviewees: ‘‘The youth are dangerous, they can ‘explode’. States have always been
afraid of that social category’’ (Belschner, the adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings,
2021), they only criticize, and they are restless (Tainturier, 2016).
Tainturier (2016) acknowledges the role of CSOs as containers and an alternative space
for these youth to incubate their social problems and overcome partisan struggles and personal
ambitions pushing towards dealing with real problems affecting the citizens.
III.1.3. Civil society mobilizer role
a. Translators of meanings
In the light of the uprisings in the region, the later transitions were known for redefining
social contracts (Pierre Tainturier, 2016). Belschner (2021) analyses the contrast of these old
omissions of youth in the decision-making process and in shifting the institutional strategies.
CSOs today are more satisfying; their emancipation mission is relatively new in the MENA
region as their political and civil society representation was absent from the domestic debates
(Belschner, The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings, 2021).
There is a strong dependence and inter-changing discourses between CSOs and youth to
translate their demands to various social and economic public requests. The United Nations
agency network points out the requirements of reaching a meaningful youth participation and
leadership. Young people and young people-led organizations should have opportunities,
capacities, and benefit from an enabling environment and relevant evidence-based programs and
policies at all levels (United Nations Inter-Agency Network on Youth, 2013, p. 2).
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Independent youth activism is not organized according to formal, institutional groupings,
the reliance on CSOs becomes important as they can limit the agglomeration of powers of the
government and other elites to whom the politic and associative life was dominated a ‘traditional
bourgeoisie’ structured along secular and liberal tendencies -from the left and from the right
(United Nations Inter-Agency Network, 2013; Koyro, 2014; Volpi, 2016). Non-state actors are
playing a significant role in the field of promoting youth inclusion for progress in Egypt, Tunisia,
and Lebanon (Ghada Barsoum, 2018; OECD, 2018).
Tainturier (2016) describes CSOs as non-state actors who have gained legacy from their
commitment to serve their local communities and regions. This formed a holistic concept that
covered all sectors of public action. Other scholars eg. Volpi (2016; Meijer, 2015) mentioned
that these official local actors were not necessarily the ones who had led the anti-regime protests.
Volpi described the civil society as:
A motley crew of young revolutionaries who would soon be blaming these
institutionalized actors and the politicians for stealing ‘their revolution’ questioning and
no longer accepting authority without questioning (Volpi, 2016)
On the other hand, Meijer (2015) emphasizes that CSOs got involved in some cases but
were not leading the Arab uprisings and their role was minor:
In Egypt, Tunisia, and Jordan professional organizations such as the Lawyers’ syndicate,
the Judges Club, and the Doctors’ Union played an important role in preparing the
ground for the uprisings, either through ideas of equality, democracy, and human rights,
or as locations where cross-ideological, cross-sectarian coalitions were formed. In
Tunisia and Egypt, trade unions would play an important role during the uprisings
(Meijer, 2015)
b. Government’s role
Post revolutions time in the region is substantially contesting the new political order and
apparent divergence of outcomes in terms of political transactions (Mansouri, 2020). That
period's strength was primarily due to broad-based public participation and civic engagement of
individual/collective youth-centered groups affecting meaningful and sustainable social
transformations (United Nations, 2014; Barsoum, 2018).
In their mixed qualitative and quantitative studies to generate semi-structured interviews,
(Mansouri, 2013; Volpi, 2016) highlighted that participation in civil activities reinforced active
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citizenship and promoted cohesion among youth vis a vis their respective representatives through
the dedicated public institutions facilitating the dialogue with the state administration. Defeating
the filthy old marginalization of considering them as ‘sub-categories’.
Anna Khakee & Ragnar Weilandt (2021) emphasized the role that CSOs played as a
space between state, market, and family where they try to shape the rules, the specific policies,
and other aspects of social life.
Súilleabháin (2020) developed on that idea of ‘check and balance’ between the civically
engaged youth and the institutions, monitoring not only the performance but also the legislature
by asking for structural changes boosting their inclusion. They also examined in their article how
included and empowered Tunisians Youth build resilient capacities through state and civil
society formation. Contrasting that in the MENA region, Tunisia is an immense agora where
public protests are legion. Successive governments and institutions could not translate the wants
of the citizens. as he described it “Tunisia became a polity of citizens without a state”
(Súilleabháin, 2020). Developing on that, Boukhars, (2015) pointed out the generational gap and
the struggle to find the jobs and opportunities they need is a prominent factor.
Tainturier (2016) explained that rejection of politics and of collective action of any
politicized group since political parties are judged as morally corrupt, being too preoccupied with
power. That shifted their reliance on the informal institutions such as free media and vibrant civil
society which were in contrast absent in the past. This is particularly relevant for young
Tunisians from the working-class context who lean on social capital as the only form of capital
that they own and that they could freely transfer their needs to challenging hegemony (Cordova,
2019).
c. Containers of aspirations
Contrarily to this reliance on civil society organizations as a replacement of
Governmental Institutions. In the Tunisian context, Maboudi (2020) highlighted the fear of
Ennahda party from the liberalization tendencies and pushed for more public opinion pressure
assuming they would be more sympathetic with their ideology. Maboudi described civil society
as “ not representative of all the people, therefore, for constitutional issues, public engagement is
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necessary because most people do not find themselves represented in associations and
organizations” (Maboudi, 2020).
Maboudi analyzed the participation of CSOs in the public fora. CSOs did not strategically
send their active youthly engaged members to steer and to develop conversations with youth
public institutions; rather than, they participated in round tables, and conferences where they had
experts debating their inclusion (2020). Quoting Koyro: “The hope that civil society could act as
a democratizing force soon proved unrealistic, or at best considerably exaggerated’’ (Koyro,
2014).
III.2. Institutions and youth mobilization through CSOs
III.2.1. Youth institutional framework
Meijer (2015) conducted a qualitative study of the legal framework of NGOs in Egypt,
Jordan, and Morocco after the Tunisian uprising. Her findings revealed that the emergence of
new laws has freed Tunisian NGOs from state interference to an unheard-of degree. Decree 88
allowed NGOs to obtain funds from foreign donors and to play political roles. “By the end of
2011, 1,200 NGOs had been registered; at the end of 2012, their number had grown to some
2000” (Meijer, 2015). The integration of NGOs to power was facilitated by the established open
parliamentary system reassuring a mediator role afterwards in Tunisia:
Law No. 2011-88 of 24/9/2011 provided clear requirements and protection in a new legal
framework that had not previously been afforded to civil society organizations. This law
created a context in which organizations could operate by guaranteeing the freedom to
form and to join associations, and to organize activities. It strengthened the role and the
development of civil society in addition to respecting its independence.
Article 3 of Law 88 encourages major principles of civil political culture: democracy,
plurality, transparency, equality, and human rights, while Article 4 prevents political
incivility by prohibiting associations from adopting by laws that call for any incitement
for violence, hatred, fanaticism, or discrimination of religious, racial, or regional
grounds (Volpi, Political developments in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, 2015, p. 22)
Globalization, the regional social movements, and the economic challenges put the
Tunisian authorities under the need to reconsider their youth institutional framework due to
youth absenteeism and lower active rates of involvement in civic life (Mansouri, 2020).
Institutionalist approaches are becoming more common after the Arab uprisings, rebuilding state
legitimacy and institutions, thus (Mansouri, 2020; Volpi, 2015; Vopli, 2016) re named this
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approach as ‘over- stating’; when the Arab state emphasizes on the individual role that CSOs
played in checking the power of the state and steering the Tunisian transition.
Volpi (2015) perceived actions and movements as a valuable source of shaping policies
rather than only criticizing the government by becoming a cooperative partner with the
government:
Certain CSOs that were active prior to the revolution need to change from their ‘against
the state’ approach to civil society work. Arguably, this has been due to the ‘you’re with
us or against us’ mentality. civil society can overwhelm the state with demands (Volpi,
Political developments in Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, 2015).
Analyzing the narratives of youth inclusion through CSOs after the revolution, Tainturier
(2016) described the post-revolutionary institutional era to agree with the liberal legislation
related to political and civil rights. And in a massive run from the international donors and
organizations supporting the democratic transition in Tunisia. Tainturier explained:
Youth participation has also been valued as a core principle and objective that ought to
drive policies. This has resulted in a new wave of civic, charities and development
organizations, led by or dedicated to youth, from grassroots to national networks (Pierre
Tainturier, 2016)
Maboudi (2020) conducted both statistical empirical study of the content of public
proposals and the existing constitutional drafts as well as interviews with Tunisian constitution
drafters. 43% of these public proposals were included in the draft constitution. Results showed a
positive relationship between the popularity of a citizen proposal and its likelihood of becoming
a constitutional provision leading to a democratic constitutional outcome. Parralely, Maboudi,
highlighted the support of the international community of donors or political affiliation in the
emancipation process leading to a better intermediate role in the public arenas (2020).
In their research on the partnership role of the EU commission in the region and their new
tendencies and discourses, Koyro (2014) described a new approach of the EU. Partnership with
people with more emphasis on the CSOs’ component, contrarily to how it used to be from the
bottom up. The emphasis on the dialogue between all civil society components, helped transmit
their needs and equipping the EU and the international cooperation to address these issues on the
ground. The study acknowledged the mistrust and pejorative perception of the youth inclusion
efforts in civic life as expressed: “The aim of the EU and other international donors should be to
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facilitate this dialogue, not to take sides” (Koyro, 2014). Volpi identified the grassroots of the
trends of local democracy in Tunisia and developed that this projected top-down approach was
not only from the international community and partners but also from the institutionalist local
structures (2016).
Tainturier (2016) highlighted that to ensure a full initialization of youth’s demands, their
participation has to be inclusive. Tunisia is considered a success story as all the active key role
players; the institutional and political limitations to pluralism were progressively lifted.
According to Belschner (2021) there is a growing interest from the international donors
to support the introduction of the quota system in the parliament boosting youth’s active
participation in public life and reintegrating them in the national projects. The study’s findings
showed that these quotas were included during the last phase H3 of the political transition after
the adoption of the constitution and during the compilation of the electoral code. The
introduction of this quota percentage by the deputies was perceived largely as a satisfactory
approach to the international community of donors and partners and not out of conviction
(Belschner, The adoption of youth quotas after the Arab uprisings, 2021).
In his description of the governance system in Tunisia prior to the uprising, Volpi (2016)
highlighted a bottom-up approach where the lowest level of the pyramid is the ‘Umda’. He is
working along with an extensive hierarchical and bureaucratic structure going all to the minister
of interior. He simultaneously holds a political role, produces a patronage network evaluating the
socioeconomic needs of the local community, and benefiting those ‘deserving’ individuals and
families. His study describes this structure as unchanged after the revolution. Going up to the
other structures of (mu‘tamadiyya) and the governorate (wilaya) where they are at the nexus
between the different local sections of national administrations and the ones to be approached to
obtain any permit (Check fig 1). Coordinating those tasks with the different parties involved and
facilitating the process is done through a delegate (Volpi, 2016). In the aftermath of the
revolution, Volpi (2016) describes the ‘new’ social forces including old civil society actors
(unions, Human Right associations, leftist organizations, and established opposition politicians)
and new civil society actors (Ennahda activists, Salafis, and revolutionary leagues.
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Figure 1: Administrative and Political structures in Tunisia
Source: (Volpi, Local (R)evolutions in Tunisia: Reconstructing Municipal Political Authority, 2016)
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Chapter IV: Research Methodology
a. Qualitative research design and sampling
The data included in this study builds in-depth interviews conducted over the course of
six months with a total number of 30 participants. The age parameters set for the research were
between 22 and 35 years of age depending on the group category of the interviewee. Interviews
were conducted with active youth, an umbrella term for young people who may not necessarily
be activists but who are engaged on one level or another in community work. CSOs’ active
members who joined these organizations after the uprising, experts and academics in the field,
and active donors representatives in the Tunisan landscape.
The actively engaged youth category is the focus of the study. The results showed that
these active young youth have a base of similar civil features – they were at some point or are
still independently involved in the Tunisian civil society. Some of them are no longer active in
civil society and decided to step back for a while, and some had previous rehabilitation with
certain institutions. The choice of these profiles is on purpose; having interviewees from
different social classes, regions, and fields of studies were the variable parameters. Some left
Tunisia for France and other neighborhooding European countries abroad, while others remained
still in Tunisia. The common feature about all of them is that they are completely not involved in
politics currently.
The other key condition or prerequisite for participation in the research– independent
from which group they are in - was the ability to speak, with first-hand knowledge, of their
experience in civil society. Interviews were inductive and the prompts allowed the participants to
voice their ideas and tell their own stories. Interviewees tended to be very forthcoming when
reflecting on their individual experiences and in describing very personal feelings. Much of this
comes through in the report. Interviews were governed by a question bank, a copy of which is
included in Appendix one.
The research paper uses advance in-depth qualitative research methods combining several
qualitative tools that are detailed in the next section. This approach is mainly to study this topic
by seeking to underline the nature of relationships and challenges between the different
components: public institutions, youth, CSOs, and donors’ communities to create youth
inclusion. This type of study allowed to answer realistic and concrete questions for today’s
young population in Tunisia by translating what is heard, seen, noticed from actions and verbs
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from the people, places, activities, and events with the “purpose of learning about some aspects
of the social world and to generate new understandings that can be used by that social world”
(Prakash Upadhyay, 2013).
A range of ethical and safety considerations was built into the study design to ensure that
the identities of the participants remained confidential and that the original recordings of the
interviews were destroyed once the analysis was conducted upon their knowledge.
b. Data collection
-

Ethnographic Fieldwork
As the definition says, “Ethnography is the study of social interactions, behaviors, and

perceptions that occur within groups, teams, organizations, and communities” (Scott Reeves,
2008, p. 337). This tool was mainly used through active participation in the field to enable the
researcher to get insights and to immerse in the participants' views and actions in an unbiased,
spontaneous way. Data were gathered mainly by attending with beneficiaries from funding and
sponsorship programs, attending workshops and trainings , getting participants' observations,
field notes, and own experiences to understand the different visions that prevail on different
levels:
- The current youth policies, the practices adopted, and to collect data and opinions on donors
community interventions and its variables.
- To assess youth aspirations and demands.
- To understand the dynamics and the real-life relationships between, among, and inter-agency
relationships, to develop a further understanding of the background of the interviewees and the
local context.
-

Interviews
Interviews were used as well simultaneously during this research as a primary data

resource. According to the interpretive constructivist researcher, the goal of an interview is to
find out how people perceive an occurrence or object and, most importantly “the meaning they
attribute to it” (Owen, 2014). They took a conversational, informal, and non-directive form.
Semi-structured way to enable the researcher to ask as many questions as he/she can/want, in the
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direction that favors the line of the study. Flexibility in adding up, canceling, or even adjusting
questions helps the researcher get more elaboration and justification.
Between forty minutes to an hour was spent with each interviewee to ensure that they had
given all relevant information. Interviewees were asked to exchange their experience, needs
challenges, perceptions of the current situation in civil involvement. Questions were asked when
only further clarification was needed. The active participation helped break down and obtain
findings for the three levels:
-The structure and discourse of civically engaged youth
-The donor interventions with CSOs of the MENA and their vision
-The challenges to youth inclusion reforms will be the impacting challenges in each
section.
Interview questions were revised to ensure that the translation allowed people to answer
without hesitation and comfortably use the sub-questions. The interviews had to be in
Arabic/French/English to be able to talk to a larger group of people, as this is also the most
convenient and effective way to gather information in the Tunisian local context, and scripts
were translated to English. Constructing the interview questions was only achieved after having a
final draft of the literature review.
-

Content Analysis

Due to the nature of the research, it was essential to have the content analysis. This tool was
used as a secondary analysis of the existing: literature, journal articles, political reports, and
books from online and offline sources (libraries, governmental websites, CSOs, networks, and
governmental institutions- mainly the ministry of youth and labor) to extract related themes and
data to the current reforms’ orientations, experiences of lobbying, and limitations to
implementations. And on a more minor reflection, to help “evaluate the language used within
documents and conduct interviews as well to search for bias or partiality” (Columbia University
Mailman School of Public Health, 2021, p. 1).
-

Sampling/Case study
The research work looked at how institutions do or do not limit the strength of its youth.

By surpassing the tenuous relationship between a robust civil society - in our case represented by
its active youth and CSOs and less revolutionary violence by not offering a legal, policy
framework of inclusion. Civil society is formed by active, dynamic youth in exchange
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relationships with public institutions to generate reforms boosting their development and
answering back sufficiently to their needed demands. They are in mutual dynamic in Tunisia
mainly- with some reference to other countries from the MENA region in analysing youth
policies.
In my research, I excluded university groups, unofficial groups (non-state recognized),
and charity organizations. The focus will be directed to CSOs and civic engaged youth
components that impact in a direct way youth and their empowerment—aiming to look at how
the power and the role of CSOs as an actor of change are limited or not by institutions.
The case of Tunisia highlights the importance of having a strong CS with the ability to
mediate and work through conflicts to aid in a country's progression through a revolution.
These social uprisings started with the Tunisian revolution and were followed up by the Egyptian
one that was not planned, centered, or organized movements rather than being youth-centered
but led mainly by civil society. Both countries have similarities and conformities in their civil
societies’ experiences.
-

Tunisia:
The Tunisian political scene had several social movements such as the ‘workers

movement’ and labor unions that were theoretically in opposition to the regime. Despite the
various confrontations received, they remained the main shapers of the Tunisian transition,
pushing Tunisia to institutionalize diverse participatory practices before and after Ben Ali’s
regime. “Engaged CSOs and strong political parties helped to maintain a vibrant national
dialogue process that culminated in the ratification of a widely praised new constitution,
revealing Tunisian’s capacity to contain its diverse population in political channels and
institutions” (ESCWA, 2014, p. 13). Various NGOs and civil society groups invaded the
Tunisian scene. Thus, the widely known ones are not appealing enough and most of the youth
either formulate new independent groups or remain active individually in a separate way and
with a full disconnection from any CSOs that are youthless. Through this research, I want to
understand the challenges between this type of trust discourse, the distraction of youth in
between these different units, and the public institutions’ stands on that.
Taking the case study of Tunisia, a cross-country experience will forecast how progress
activities can better meet the requests of youth during this period in the history of the region and
under this international structural guidance. Considering that after the Arab Spring, civil society
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with its active youth groups has colossal tension between the will of its young people and
expressing a policy designed to target their needs eluding tensions.
c. Data analysis
Following the data collection plan, data followed the data triangulation method to assess the
validity, and reliability of the findings. Triangulation facilitated data validation through cross
verification from more than two sources. Testing the consistency of findings obtained through
different instruments increases the chance to control, or at least to assess, some of the threats or
multiple causes influencing my results (Betterevaluation, 2020). Since the gathered data are
purely qualitative, the coding system is a process of identifying the items in the finding to get a
meaningful link (CESSDA, 2021). Coding is the process of identifying a passage in the text or
other data items, searching and remembering concepts, and finding relations between them. It
will be used for all research tools with a cross analyzing, and comparison of the different
collected findings.
d. Ethical considerations
Ethical considerations bound this study to be part of the researcher's responsibilities
towards his scientific mission. After receiving the IRB approval on November 27th, 2021. First,
making the research's nature and theme clear to the CSOs and youth involved is one of the
informants' fundamental rights. That's why, the researcher explained the primary research's main
purpose and identified himself before the study using consent, anonymity, and voluntary
participation. . Pseudonyms were used in the presentation of data for ethical considerations for
some interviewees. Those interviews later helped refine the study questions and frame the
discussion guides as well as contribute to the development of key conclusions and
recommendations. Worth adding- as common to qualitative research, this study does not claim
sample representativeness.
e. Limitations
Three instruments were used to investigate in this research: interviews, document review, and
ethnographic observations. However, The limited number of participants and the lack of a
realistic gender representation might cause some limitations influencing the results. The content
analysis is built to gain information about the people’s past experiences with political
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participation to comprehend if there has been any change with their impact on the governmental
orientations, demands, aspirations, and reforms. For that, I heavily relied on snowballing method
to get interviewees. Although, there was a consent form signed prior to the interview and
recordings were made only if accepted. Trust challenges and the lack of an equal participation
from donors’ community. Other limitations were related to the limited time I worked on my
paper; online resources from public institutions were limited and the interview requests
were delayed and cancelled. however, I considered resorting online desk research, websites, live
and online recordings which offered me the opportunity to go through the discussions.
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Chapter V: Study Findings
There is an initial need to discuss the relationship dynamics perceived by CSOs and
institutions. The findings are divided into four main chapters. In the upcoming sections, there
will be separate chapters discussing the different relationships and challenges raised by the
interviewees over the study. The understanding process included interviewing various CSOs,
active youth, development partners, and relevant youth institutions to stand on the status of youth
participation, challenges, and areas of improvements.The sample included a wide range of CSOs
and active youth from different regions and different fields of civic engagement.
V.1. The perception of youth and CSOs on the role of the public institutions
Public institutions are the main official correspondents with youth and CSOs dealing with
many social and economic challenges to solve especially post 2011. The situation becomes more
sensitive yet challenging knowing that the expectations of young people ae always higher and
faster than the performance of these institutions. In this framework, this chapter will analyze the
nature of relationship and the perceptions between institutions, youth, and CSOs. By analyzing
the existing challenges causing these tendinous liaisons. These challenges vary between
bureaucracy to the complexity the implementation system, the instability of the country and its
red tape processes.
a. Bureaucracy and complex systems
When tapping into the implementation of processes and reforms, mentioning the challenge of
bureaucracy comes up on the top of the list for interviewees and the case of Alexandre is no
difference. Alexandre as his family named him, a Tunisian street artist and the co-founder of
Brotherhood Art in Sousse in 2014. The organization aims at joining different communities into
the same ground through artwork. Alexandre describes the current relations between public
youth institutions and CSOs: “The system needs to change; the relationship between the design
and the NGOs must be more straightforward. We are artists, and we do not require complex
processes” (Maalel). In his experience, he was in constant interactions with public institutions
and the various youth structures ‘Al Hayakel Al Chababya’ in any matter related to the
inauguration of his NGO to any on the ground activity. Coming from the nature of the work they
deliver as an organization, there is a crucial need to emerge in the administrative bubble to
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perform any street Art. In describing the relationship between public institutions, youth
structures, and organizations, he outlines his rigid opposition to the processes imposed:
As in the Brotherhood Art organization, we are against bureaucracy and hate
administrative work. It was hard to convince our team to make the first conceptual
framework papers for youth. You know! (Maalel)
Similarly, and developing on the rigid processes and the unbreakable ties imposed, Asma,
28 years old who is a board member in the Red Croissant in Mattouia’s local branch. Mettaouia,
a town and a commune in southeastern Tunisia, she developed when mentioning one example of
hurdles despite having Red Croissant as one of big NGOs in the country:“Procedures to get the
physical space are very hard, a lot of paperwork, of procedures till you lose hope. The public
process is complicated” (Attig, 2022). This complication in the processes led to creating
fluctuating relationships with institutions and local CSOs generating deception, loose contact,
and aggression. Unteaching the trust and hope that were gained from the revolution. Asma added
after finishing the interview on a following up note that the local institutions/ authorities- such as
the municipality and the area district tended to have a centric culture and to strong willingness to
get the full credits and disgracing any other stakeholder:
Local authorities like municipalities and the local district authorities do not know how to
encourage CSOs at the beginning. But if a project or an initiative becomes successful,
they pretend that it’s theirs and get ownership even though it’s us who did the job. They
just like to jump in and love being at the spotlight’ (Attig, 2022)
Ayman is a young activist, studied in a small coastal city called Mahdia and founded his
NGO, in Jendouba, a city in the northern side of the country. Jendouba is an important
crossroads with many road links to other towns. Today, he wrapped up his 28 years old, he was
reflecting on his experience during university times. He was describing the different
relationships between his professors and educators with students as the first institutional body to
meet as a youth. They were very helpful in his small community and facilitated the creation of
small clubs within his university; that was the start of his engagement. Today, he is working with
the Tunisian Center for Social Entrepreneurship (TCSE). It is the first of its kind in Tunisia. The
innovative board co-creates local ecosystems in Tunisia, and the center comes up with new ideas
to tackle social problems while working with unemployed people in both rural and urban areas.
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In parallel, he is the founder of an NGO; ‘‘Youtheon’’ in Jendouba with the mission to unleash
the power of youth locally and to be an active actor in the community to make a change.
The NGO ‘‘Youtheon’’ is based on sharing experiences and exchange following a youthto-youth modality. Their first project and most known project in his region was implemented
with the National Democratic Institution and iDebate where they were recruited as local
executors. Their major role was to set a common ground between the deputies in the parliament
with youth in Jendouba. Capacity building to the selected youth was a part of the program, these
youth were trained in debate and negotiation by ‘Youtheon’. The outcomes were presented and
discussed with the deputies in a form of debate. In subsequent stages, these youth were supposed
to start implementing their recommendations after being endorsed with the public institutions.
This project extended on two years starting 2020 and a lot of money was invested by
international donors. Thus, as an NGO, they had no legal status to present those demands or
recommendations to the parliament and the only way for them was to lean on political parties’
support as channels of transmission. The experience of Aymen is very common to a lot of NGOs,
they undertake a long paper work process but then that does not guarantee their approval and
they might failling or incompleting the process due to the instability and other challenges that
will be mentioned in the upcoming sections. Describing the challenging process of legally initial
opening his NGO from bureaucracy to long waiting lists:
Bureaucracy, please mention that a lot as a challenge! … We launched our own
organization, enough of working under people.‘Youtheon’ was our baby. We managed to
get all the approvals legally. The process was hectic back in 2019. We had several
problems: how to get the municipality to approve us. How to open a bank account for the
organization; all banks were avoiding CSOs for fear of money laundering. We had to do
illegal ways to get the authorization (Bouazizi, 2022)
Another testimony of the rigid processes, Hamza is an active youth from Mourouj, a
commune in the southern suburbs of Tunis, the capital. With other motivated youth, they wanted
to inaugurate Youth Clubs in the area. Association Youth Clubs, founded in 2013, focuses on
education sustainable development and today is headquartered in El Mourouj 1, Tunis, Tunisia.
The association aims to ensure good education to have healthy citizens responsible and ready for
professional life. Noting in their definition:
Youth Clubs bring together over 1,200 young pupils and students who belong to 54 Youth
Clubs coming from 14 regions of the country. This is through the inclusion of
extracurricular activities in all schools, the training of our members in several areas (soft
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skills, hard skills, advocacy ...) wishing to improve education in Tunisia, to have a better
country2 (Internet Society, 2022)
Despite having looser tights on NGOs and their creations and the boom of CSOs that
civil society witnessed, it is still raising several complex questions. In the case of Hamza, the
organization was opened by others from another local community within the same area back in
2016 as a branch of his local high school. In describing the challenges faced in his attempt,
which ultimately ended up failing:
The only possible way for them to open it up was through the local Youth Center
“Maison des Jeunes” and not through high school, and we were only high school
students, no options at that time (Mahjoubi, 2022)
Hamza pointed out in his experience to the lack of trust and the rigid relationship
between the Youth Centers and youth initiators themselves. In asking about those requirements,
he highlighted the need to have everyone endorsing you to be able to move. They needed to have
the high school officially endorsing them and having them as incubators by offering spaces for
meetings and activities. But, opposed to their thoughts, their high school refused “Our high
school refused to be part of this. A big responsibility for them” (Mahjoubi, 2022).
The bureaucratic sphere governing the public institutions processes and their reluctance
to take any responsibility when interacting with youth before 2011 and the following years
affected the trust towards the credibility of the governmental initiatives and its institutions that
are supposed to be dedicated to serve youth and to make sure that their demands and needs are
locally ensured and satisfied. The interviewees shared that after participation in the revolution of
January 2011 many youths suffered from burnout including himself and withdrawal from the
public scene and the civic life. This is because of some emerging groups with certain ideologies
and agendas that took over the youth demands. The lack of youth socio political engagement
affected the trust in a state commitment to engage youth in policy-making and public concerns.
The quotes retrieved from the interviewees reflect and emphasize that there was an absence of
trust in a real adults' commitment to initiate an engagement program or a discussion platform.
During the interview with the Program Manager in Search for Common Ground,
Hendrick, described the lack of parallel conversations and understanding between the various
stakeholders as a ‘dilemma’. Between the will to have a full inclusion of youth in their matters
2

https://arab.org/directory/youth-clubs-association/, 2022
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and in others but also the will of youth who is energetic and powerful enough to change and to
see concrete transformations. The misunderstanding lays in the translating mechanisms and the
inefficiency of the presented approaches: “The willingness to include youth from local
authorities exists but does that translate into actions? I sometimes see it is true only in certain
cases where there is a political will” (Hendrick, 2022).
Search for Common Ground is an international NGO working on several projects in
Tunisia and has offices in other countries since 2012. The NGO has a main role as an
implementer of projects, a coordinator, and a third party involved in youth engagement projects.
Imen, working as the Country Director of both offices in Tunisia and Libya for SFCG and a
previous worker in the Ministry of Youth described the flourishing ecosystem for CSOs.
Hendrick and Imen both described the relationship after the uprising between CSOs and Public
youth reforms as generally fluctuating with seasonal patterns that are dependent on many
external variables.
After the uprising, the relationship between CSOs and public institutions received much
more attention and was considered in constant improvement between 2013 and 2014, as
described by Afef (Talbi, 2022) . Afef was an active youth from Kasserine, working with ‘3ish
Tunisi’ (live Tunisian). An associative movement, then a political movement in the form of a
coalition of electoral lists, was founded in April 2018. In November 2018, the association
conducted a broad participatory democracy campaign. For three months, the members of the
association gathered on the ground the opinions of citizens and their proposals to get the country
out of the economic and social crisis. The campaign is also carried out on the internet and social
networks and via telephone calls. Since its creation, the association has been attacked by political
parties and certain media about its sources of funding. The organization is also accused of
receiving foreign funding, of resorting to illegal lobbying activities, and even of working on
behalf of foreign states due to its funding sources as Afef reflected.
b. Instability and security
Respondents working in public institutions and have direct work with youth and civil
society noted that society tends to handpick which projects to implement. This is linked to the
available infrastructure, security, and instability of the country. On the other hand, respondents
from CSOs were left with mixed discontinuous information, unclear requirements, and confusing
procedures. This raised more concerns about considering institutions as their core partners. As an
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active engineer by education and civically engaged by passion, Aymen the founder of
‘Youtheon’ describes their work as a creator of an enabling atmosphere in unleashing Tunisia’s
youth potential towards a sustainable future for their community. Ayman was describing the
general process:
Local authorities were not very cooperative with us, and they did not want to see
someone who asked them questions. We couldn’t even reach the point of talking to them.
Today the same situation with a lot of NGOs. They do much work but then end up failing
or incomplete due to the instability (Bouaziz)
In a similar experience shared by Houssem from Sidi Bouzid, founder of ATEJ
organization. ATEJ supports young people in public life and contributes to the economic and
social empowerment of young people. The local area Sidi Bouzid, where the organization works,
is the birthplace of the revolution and has become yet another symbol of poverty and
disillusionment (Petré, 2015). In describing his experience, Houssem highlighted the public
perception towards CSOs in Sidi Bouzid amid the terrorism cases, economic crashes, and
protests, which all played a major role in putting certain parts of the country under tighter
restrictions and emphasized on regional disparity and marginalization practices:
.. I did not reach anything, and I couldn’t help and decided to create my own CSO. Youth
in Sidi Bouzid either went to Syria or died in the mountains for the name of ‘Jihad’ – I
don’t want to use that word. We want to change that perception that we are terrorists.
After 2011 and around 2013, the Ministry of Interior gave us that tag in the Tunisian
society and society. Already we are classified as the second area to export jihadists and
especially ‘khalifates’ who are the leaders in every terrorist organization. It is normal to
get brainwashed. We do not have any public space working and dedicated to youth’s
needs do not have anything! (Dhahri, 2022)
Houssem linked this regional marginalization due to the instability of the country as a
major argument used. There were successive acts of terrorism the region and a lot of pressure
was exerted to limit that including the sabotage excreted on CSOs. As Houssem describes the
process he went through to officially launch his CSO : “I opened the CSO in 2018 after I
submitted our legal files. Right after five days, the Quranic school event happened and the
Ministry just stopped all its legal authorizations. It took us a year to get our paperwork”
(Dhahri, 2022.)
In interviewing Mohammed who is a previously active member in various local NGOs.
Currently, he works with a regional organization operating across the MENA region, providing

49

propitious conditions for the development of education, culture, sciences, the environment, and
communication in the Arab World. In investigating the challenges between CSOs and public
institutions, he directly linked it to the administrative processes which are disseminating a lot of
opportunities, especially funds-related ones. Since a good number of organizations get blocked at
that first stage. Thus, on the other hand, he justified this causal relationship between those slow
steps with the attitude of administrators with the security issue:
The problem is in the administrative system in Tunisia. Funds exist, but when you get into
the formalities, it is very challenging; even hearing the word email correspondence is
frightening for them. This is my experience with public institutions. Today, to get money
from abroad, you either open a restaurant or an NGO! The word association got a bad
reputation. 56,000 CSOs were created. Security is very important also for Tunisia
(Mohammed,2022)
This classification of NGOs set more entry barriers to the smaller, size organizations and
to the ones outside of the central city. Setting them back not only from creating diverse NGOs
but also reducing their visibility and their outreach to funds. This practice contradicts with the
development initiatives and plans of the interior areas that are at the core of the government and
of the development partners’ strategies.
c. Building ties with youth institutions
Developing on the nature of the current relationships between both, Mohammed
explained the important role that CSOs were playing on several layers and in softening this
tension between youth and institutions. Encouraging institutions to work more on building those
relationships as it is bilateral, and each needs the other to create a better inclusive environment.
CSOs were always there despite the tension between them and the implementers' institutions:
CSOs were the savior of Tunisia in many instances. People donated and they are the ones
who saved Tunisia during the pandemic, for example. They are very strong and the country
cannot function without them (Mohammed, 2022)
In a similar pattern, Sana, a former Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) expert with Search
for Common Ground and a civically engaged youth, highlighted this need for CSOs to interact
with institutions and the role of implementers when they work/partner with local CSOs. SFCG,
classified as an international organization operating in several countries. They do receive grants
and donations to establish need-based projects. From her experience and double role in civil
society and with SFCG, she highlighted the urge to facilitate these programs. SFCG Tunisia team
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supports addressing the country’s conflicts constructively. Including Tunisia’s democracy
through a leadership development program for youth and through the training of media
organizations (Search for Common Ground, 2022). SFCG’s approach is a holistic one counting
on all stakeholders. 83% of the teams are local to the countries they are working in. Their vision
is to foster cooperation and change the everyday interactions between groups of people
intervening, so they can work together to build up their community, choosing joint problemsolving over violence (Search for Common Ground, 2022). As Sana explains:
Public reforms today need youth and CSOs together. You can only make changes in the
communities using local potential. It will be more accepted if it’s coming from youth to
youth with an invisible governmental hand (Guesmi, 2022)
The interview process also included some local youth centers representative to tap on
these challenges previously mentioned and to analyze their perspective when it comes to
building ties with CSOs and youth respectively. One of the interviewees is the director of a
public youth center in a small town in the commune of Tunis Governorate, Tunisia. Samir, who
plays a double role as also an active member of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) and
in civil society in parallel to his current position in the youth center. When asked about the
process of bureaucracy, he highlighted those bureaucratic processes are still existent, and they
are indeed causing a lack of fluidity in terms of projects and services delivered.
Thus, giving an explanation to these processes especially contrasting the period after the
uprising when money laundering and getting money from abroad was critical for terrorism and
sponsoring certain organizations:
I know a lot of CSOs you do not know from where and how their funds are coming and
going with no visibility at all. I’m open and happy to speak to everyone, but I cannot
accept any NGO pretending to be serving the community but instead delivering hidden
messages. I personally do not engage and work with CSOs without doing an extensive,
intensive background check, even if they have/ bring a fortune as a fund. But there are
small CSOs who are neglected (Samir, 2022)
Although this process of verification is very much needed considering the instability and
the external challenges in the country. Thus, it is important to point out its double-edged sword
role as well. It also on the other hand, the process of verification smashes the vulnerable and the
small sized CSOs. Better communication ties and clearer processes could potentially be a
solution to this as pointed out by Samir. Hence, the communication flow with the concerned
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youth institutions as per Semah from Mattouia is “centric and excluding” (Abdeljabar, 2022).
Semah, being both a public institution worker in constant and daily work with the
municipalities and active youth in different NGOs in his area with Junior Chamber International
(JCI). He describes the process as ‘easy’ for him to communicate with the respective authorities
due to their ‘need’ for his services, considering his position in the public sector. This reminds us
of the old practices of the previous regime where nepotism, biases, and acquaintances were
dominating civil society. This was a common observation for practice that most interviewees
pointed out to. The relationship between CSOs and public institutions is strongly to be a one
sided, profitable, and almost never equal in terms of power balance exerted.
Mongia is a law degree student and a previous candidate in the municipal elections. She
was a participant in the first experiment of participatory budgeting in the local municipality of la
Marsa. The program was piloted there, the goal is for municipalities across the country have
authorized and participated in a series of public meetings where residents vote to distribute part
of the budget for local services: “These participatory budgeting programs have given direct
fiscal authority to those who know the needs and priorities of their cities best” (Tadamun, 2016).
The work was implemented by an INGO as part of a partnership with and between the local
government. The INGO was working with several CSOs and active local actors. Describing the
process; lack of visibility, and the non-continuity in the projects leading ultimately to the
aversion of the young people’s civic role category. In describing her experience, Mongia
described her experience tapping on those challenges:
Participants did not have that visibility or details. The project did not pass, everyone just
forgot about it in the following years. The Local Communities Journal was not adopted
by the parliament, yet which included this project of Participatory Democracy. So, for
2017, all decisions were not implied. I heard they tried this experience again in 2018. I
lost track (Souid, 2022)
The discontinuity in the projects was also a major hurdle for Search for Common Ground
as an implementer partner in several initiatives and equally to a lot of CSOs. As Sana described
based on their assessment and impact analyses, they did not have for aim to make any concrete
visible change or high Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) rather than to create a lobby of
pressure and a massive disturbance to influence the decision making process and to shift the
narratives:
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On a larger scale, I don’t think it was implemented, it was more communitymunicipality. The project ended there but the work continued with the beneficiaries
themselves… I saw the impact on two levels. Working on the INGOs is different from
working with local CSOs. My experience taught me that it’s not only about the funds, but
people are also actually doing work despite the challenges you still see the local impac
(Guesmi, 2022)
In answering the same question describing the relationship between institutions and youth
especially after the revolution and the shift change happened. Achraf, an academic researcher,
and lecturer in Middle East politics with special focus on Islamism and democratization
explained in that regard:
Youth felt more empowered, they voiced out their needs etc.. but still, the civil society
component was under pressure, political parties too for sure. There were no institutions
independent to hear these voices (Achraf, 2022)
Oussema, who is currently working as a political advisor in one of the foreign African
Embassies, founder of VOTEK application, a first in Tunisia to include digital in the sphere of
municipalities, for e-participative democracy. He used to be very active in CSOs and particularly
a finalist in ‘I’m the President’ reality TV show to encourage their participation in the political
life and in the decision making process empowering the next generation of Tunisian democratic
leaders. Young Tunisians essentially retracted from formal politics to operate mainly in civil
society and grassroots activism (Bajec, 2022). Houssem was asked about how he sees the role of
young people’s civic role CSOs in the system. He described the several stages that they pass
through, from a homogeneous power for pressure to a reluctant and passive role with a tendency
to volunteering activities more than a proper inclusion in civic life. Houssem described: “Even if
they used to have CSOs they used to work for the regime, like a cartoon, a puppy just following
and obeying rules. Politicians used to refuse critica” (Dridi, 2022).
Now CSOs are a mass of power through their voices as a pressure to rectify. CSOs and
youth do not have the role of deciding, they are more of controllers, youth now do not even want
to vote. Stabbing back one of the most import pillars of democratic transitions. On that, Semah
responded from his expertise in working with the Ministry of Equipment and his coverage of the
area, Gabes played a parallel role as an active agent in CS. Semah was confirming the lack of
active engagement politically of youth and their tendency to give up on the political arena to
make their voices heard. He detailed:
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My work in CSOs started in 2013-2012. I started with volunteering in Gabes with an
organization to push people to go to vote. This was because of the statistics that showed
60 percent of youth do not go / refuse to vote (Abdeljabar, 2022)
This challenge contributed to a lack of trust in the existence of a plan or a tool for
connecting youth with policymakers. That was a key factor that contributed to the social and
political unrest that took place post-January 2011. Many youths including the interviewee
decided to withdraw from the public domain and focus on their personal life due to the absence
of the feel of a real change taking place on the national level.
d. Corruption and lack of adequate communication channels
According to Imen’s experience in both the public institutional reforms as a former
worker in the Ministry of Youth and with SFCG as a connector of funds, and with CSOs with the
goal of engaging their local governance. There was a nuance in the results and some projects
were sustainable and others not. What is sure is that they noticed a lot of youth civil activists
becoming bright in their societies and local change agents carrying on with what they got from
training and capacity building. Connecting that to some of the challenges that the local level does
have; even if there are great initiatives and proposals fitting the reformal context by these youth a
lot of them will be seen but will not be endorsed due to the lack of funds:
One difficulty is that even if the idea is cool, the local authorities cannot implement the
project because of the lack of funds, so there is no sustainability for municipalities and
for those projects (Hendrick, 2022)
Semah, from his position working with the Ministry of Equipment developed parallelly
on that. Mentioning the lack of self-funds from the public institutions and their incapability to
sponsor projects nor initiatives. In addition to the tight, rigid framework of processes making it
even harder to open for innovation and to attract investors. He explained:
Whenever I say government, I mean the institutions responsible for fixing certain issues.
We as workers in public institutions can see the problems inside. We have very rigid
laws, and we should change them. Imagine now we are still using paper in everything;
we do not have modems even in our offices. And now they are calling for innovations –
ironic laughter (Abdeljabar, 2022)
From one side, there is a huge budget deficit and incapability for institutions to provide
space and to sponsor initiatives. On the other hand, more and more restrictions are exerted on
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these CSOs in their operating level, limiting their access to funds. Amid the recent changes to
law in Tunisia, decree 88, arguments were questioning its necessity as a new NGO regulatory
law while Decree 88 was not even fully implemented and was only on paper. The decree puts
more restrictions particularly on foreign funding (Project on Middle East Democracy, 2018).
Rashed from the Iwatch organization sees the future consequences on the scalability and even the
existence of CSOs after such instability and sudden changes. He explains:
The problem is how these new regulations will be implemented, the amendment of the 88
Decree institutions versus CSOs relations. With the suspension of the parliament a lot of
NGOs disappeared because they didn’t adapt their work mainly with the parliament
changes. These organizations need to think how to diverse themselves and about their
scalability (Rashed, 2022)
Public institutions were not highly appreciated for their communication schemes too as
previously mentioned. The fragile communication spread and the centralized approach makes it
hard not only for youth but also for CSOs- as connectors to establish that long lived connection
of trust. This perception clustered and classified CSOs into categories of who will benefit from
the funds and offered trainings. This led to the creation of a divide between them and disabled
any room of cooperation. As explained by Alexandre describing the ‘unequal’ distribution of
rights and duties and their selective approach when it comes to opportunities from the public
institutions through their tailored reforms vis a vis CSOs.
The perception of youth towards public institutions is shaped by their share from the
projects and infrastructure building investments in the area. Reshaping and rebalancing the scales
and the distributions with decentralization was a key element and recommendation mentioned by
the interviewees from whom some fled the country and cut off their ties with any civic
engagement there. They described their experience as deceptive, and marginalizing despite the
amount of freedom that was guaranteed after the uprising. As Hamza stated:
I would accept going back to Tunisia to have a bit of power. You need to have the power
to impose your respect. But I want when I come back to Tunisia to make a change, a real
one. I’m thinking about this every day. I don’t want to go back to being a follower
(Mahjoubi, 2022)
Oussama explained the general new attitude of youth where they feel still underrepresented in an
old institutional framework, as himself:
The promises are lies, we will improve the situation, employability etc. That’s why a lot
of youth are immigrating. Not everyone is thinking of just leaving not only for academics,
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but they are also just escaping. Being in Tunisia is a source of psychological disorder
(Dridi, 2022)
As mentalities and needs are changing, convincing public officials today that it is equally
important to municipalities and public institutions to collaborate with and among each other’s for
better youth inclusion. Being young people’s civic role is just a stage. Respondents who were at
a certain point after the uprising active and engaged in the civic scene decided to leave after
losing the flare with a passive deceptive attitude. This is a common realization between all
interviewees: similar civil features – they were at some point or are still independently involved
in the Tunisian civil society. Some of them are no longer active in civil society and decided to
step back and some had rehabilitation with certain public institutions. Others left Tunisia for
France and other European countries while others remained still in Tunisia. The common feature
about all of them is that they are completely not involved in political life currently or about to
leave. Mongia explained this referring to her experience as a local coordinator in the
participatory budget pilot project in Sidi Bou Said municipality:
Now, I’m seeing deception, I do not see any encouragement. When we see the projects,
we think that it’s going to be Beverly hills but later we conclude that it is nothingWe do
not even hear about the general municipality meetings, some representatives join, others
not. I stepped out from the scene (Souid, 2022)
Interviewees from youth who did not take any leadership positions, are just put behind
desks. The way of hand picking the most talented and brilliant youths, and giving them other
positions to take care of was a practice of the old regime to make them leave the political and
civic scene. Houssem detailed on this raising important questions to be considered:
Why not youth leading political parties? Do we have ideas? From 220 political parties,
less than 3 do have youth represented. That’s why youth are not joining the political
arena, you are young, too early for you, you don’t know anything. Foreigners trusted us,
why not you? They don’t even trust you to hear your voice (Dridi, 2022)
Respondents were all pointing out the lack of a similar line of communication between
both the institutions and they with no synchronization. A stable flow of communication brings
creative ideas and innovations as well. As Alexandre explained from his stand as a street artist
and delivering his messages through art movements. What was interesting and brought relevant
new data is that respondents from the hard-to-reach communities had their local municipalities
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and youth centers supporting them. Reasons varied as some explained, due to the narrow, small
number of local citizens, communities tend to know each other and tend to give referral for
support. Hence, since limited by resources anyways, the impact is not as visible as in other areas.
This attachment to the local communities created a sense of exclusion as per Ayman’s
experience. He founded his NGO is a region other than where he was born and raised:
I’m working in a region that is not mine, I felt as a stranger, dialects, behaviors wise,
they are a bit of a closed society. They were different, serving in Jendouba although I’m
from Kasserine, Sbeitla. It’ll be more than 8 years now since we were working there so
they are starting to accept us (Bouazizi, 2022)
There is still this mentality among local authorities in specifically underprivileged
communities, sometimes it’s hard for them to hear recommendations from youth. They do not
look at you seriously. However, the local CSOs as local structures can make a link. CSOs can
bring the perspective of youth and local authorities to involve youth though involving the local
community, you need to have the public institutions resources by your side. That perception of
youth as a non-mature component increased the old practices of bureaucracy and authority using
a linear pattern. As Hamza, who during high school year wanted to open a club in his local high
school. Describing his experience:
These criteria were silly, like the youth club wanted us to be recognized by the high
school and some signatures on papers. We couldn’t get these approvals. It made a bit of
sense as we needed to have their endorsement to get where to do our meetings, make the
coordination with the municipality if needed and ensure all the bureaucratic work on our
behalf as our guaranteed/ supervisors. Our high school refused to be part of this
(Mahjoubi, 2022)
Hamza who is now pursuing his studies abroad and used to be an active youth in his
region with Youth Centers and other initiatives describes his perception of CSOs who get funds
from private parties and external communities. Reflecting on his experience, he mirror the idea
of being biased and losing much of your independence once you receive funds especially with
the sensitive political instability that the country is passing through:
It’s all about money, politics now. You should sell your soul. I’m not sure if there is hope
for Tunisia, but I just pray that there is some (Mahjoubi, 2022)
Along with bureaucracy and political exclusion, passive role, nepotism, wasta, and
referral is still a major force power re-shaping the balances in these CSOs when dealing with
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institutions creating untrust. Between these bilateral challenges from youth and institutions
equally, as even public institutions, locally they are trying to make their work effective, people
won’t accept from them as they see any of their speeches linked to personas, they need CSOs to
disperse the local central system to the other regions. public institutions are not facilitating the
connection, people do not trust them despite all the changes. Youth concerns are transversal. It’s
not only in ministries or public institutions, but also a transversal process where a lot of
ministries join and have interactions. None of these pillars could work alone, starting with the
youth centers will not be able to do anything without the intervention of other CSOs and partners
and even better with the private sector.
V.2. Damaging in youth perceptions to CSOs
Civil society is highly important in promoting youth participation and engagement in any
society. One of the key advantages for civil society organizations is the ability to access areas
that the government may have challenges in reaching due to lack of resources but mainly if these
CSOs do not manage to get youth onboard with them as support. In this interviewees who were
or are members of CSOs shared their insights. The interviews focused on the perspectives of
these youth towards CSOs in Tunisia today and on the current level of participation and what is
needed to promote youth participation and its importance.
a. Networking opportunity and creating local change
Joining the civil society activities as a young youth opened up the floor to their skills to
flourish and to develop. The path was not easy as CSOs and civil society work was always linked
to the previous regime and youth did not understand nor see the impact of their work
immediately. Semah describes the perception of his peers when he first embarked civil society
work: “They used to laugh at us in coffee shops. They were always asking us, what will you gain
from this? Or how much are they giving you?” (Abdeljabar, 2022).
Respondents confirmed the shift of this perception and the shift of civil society work to
be a source of employment rather than a place to only voice needs. As Semah described: “After
years of exclusion and making fun of us, a lot have joined us, and our network. They now feel
like they want to listen to our experiences” (Abdeljabar, 2022). Respondents are or were at some
point relying on CSOs opportunities through the funds they receive as jobs. Those transitional
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jobs offered them the opportunities to open to the international market and more than half
respondents are currently working with well Known INGOs abroad or in Tunisia. Having civil
society as a third job provider is a transitional shift that is threatened currently by the different
ecosystem challenges such as instability and lack of funds.
Through, respondents confirmed the positive space and impact that civil society offers
CSOs to deliver services. On the other hand, it offered a space for a good number of youths to
get jobs in CSOs as they become recruiters themselves. CSOs became a source of employability,
offering jobs, and positions to qualified youth. As Sameh explained from his experience on how
he got his current job with the Ministry of Equipment, it was by reference from his previous
CSOs engagement. His engagement with civil work enabled him to develop his skills and to
learn other than are not traditionally taught in schools. Semah described:
I felt very empowered and started looking for other NGOs who will give me more
opportunities to grow as I felt really a good influence on my career. Like now I have an
idea about every topic. I was a finalist and I’m happy I must create such a big network. I
don’t need to have a degree to understand certain fields, just through civil society
(Abdeljabar, 2022)
Oussema explained the nature of the relationship between the CSOs and youth
themselves. Starting from the idea of not expecting anything in return except self-satisfaction,
local change, and the idea of serving. Right after the revolution, youth were thirsty for change
and eager to give up from their time to create change. Respondents were explaining a new
tendency of youth of only volunteering with charity work and refuting any involvement and
engagement with CSOs only if it is in the context of employment and paid. Oussema, explained
that:
You should not and do not expect anything, I spent 8 years of free giving. My neighbors
were surprised as if I’m wasting time. Before I was dull and did not even know how to
take the initiative to speak up in public. Now I can voice my opinion and ideas and debate
for them but I need to see my future too (Dridi, 2022)
IWatch, a leading watchdog NGO in Tunisia enhancing transparency and fighting
corruption through projects related to the UNCAC. They follow two main principles: No
exclusion and no trusteeship. Rashed, who holds a strategic position in the organization
described the aim of their work and how to use that as an influencing power. A power that can
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hold accountable the public institutions and seek to have a visible representation and a clear
strategy to implement youth empowerment projects with no corruption:
We do not care if it passes or not, more of raising awareness. People should be aware
it’s for them and we aim to make them know, we are going to say we are here to rule (,
2022)
b. Disorganized, no unity
One of the most pressing challenges that CSOs are facing today is the lack of unity. The
revolution was characterized by a massive collaboration between the different civil society
components including CSOs and the civically engaged youth. Rami explains the consequences of
such dissociation and its implications on the massive power pressure engendering an abuse of
power at the hands of the locals public institutions and disempowering the voiced requests:
Unity of CSOs is very crucial, differences should unite us and not the opposite even if we
have different ideologies. Real established vision, voice for people. Without having that,
you will face a very vulnerable abuse of power (Rami, 2022)
Respondents mentioned other challenges besides the defies between CSOs but also
within the structure of CSOs leading to youth disengagement. No bilateral communication
between the members, with a very steep, vertical decision-making process making their
consolidated efforts divided. The absence of a clear pyramid for structure enables conflicts of
interests to take over. Aymen explained from his experience in activism in his local area, as an
dynamic, engaged youth after the revolution that there was a huge lack of coordination between
the different CSOs. In addition to no collaboration on the local level. Respondents were all
mentioning the redundancy in the topics and areas of work with the absence of synergy without a
real change on the ground level.
c. Easy money and corruption
The perception of youth nowadays and their activism was shaken by the previous
unsuccessful, unfinished experiences and attempts of change whether locally or on a larger scale.
Sarra, currently working with a leading tech company worldwide in Ireland, left Tunisia a couple
of years ago for better job opportunities. Her responses were showing deception and
disappointment from what is happening but still her commitment to support the country in any
form but outside the civil society work. Respondents from whether students or workers abroad
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all highlighted their frustration as a major reason for them to leave the country besides the lack
of adequate opportunities is their disempowerment. Sara explains her perception:
We all know that a lot of CSOs are taking money from the offered funds for personal use.
I know someone who got a grant and went to Canada using that money. There is a lot of
corruption! I do not trust them personally. Only the bare minimum is not corrupted, I
would not give my money to Tunisian organization at all now (Sarra, 2022)
Other responses besides corruption identified criticism towards the actual programs
offered as they do not really identify or tackle the local needs. The programs implemented and
the set reforms by the public institutions or in partnerships with donors are not based on solid
mapping or needs assessment that takes into consideration the different layers’ requests. Even
before going further with the interview questions regarding receiving donors ‘funds, Dorra
interrupted the discussion with her short insights on interacting with institutions:
When I got inside the politics in CSOs I realized some of them are very complex and
have problems they need to fix. I’ve never dealt with public institutions or been a
beneficiary of any of their reforms.I didn’t got circle did have a very horrible experience
dealing with the public sector, we always try to avoid it (Arbia, 2022)
Kamel was working as a facilitator with the Ma3an project: “The goal of Ma3an is to
increase the capacity of Tunisian communities to withstand political, social and economic
challenges and identify opportunities” (USAID). The program is with partnership with the
Tunisian government funded by USAID and implemented by FHI60 lab, Kamel was among the
selected facilitators to receive the extensive capacity building training and will implement the
program in his local area. Ma3an is based on needs mapping and then rounded dialogue with the
intervening authorities to debate, discuss, change, and implement the initiatives extracted from
the mapping process. When giving his opinion on the project, he explains:
In Tunisia, this is my bread (referring to being a trainer). if you want to get money just
open an organization. If you know your ways, you can make money, no impact or
whatsoever. The project Ma3an in partnership with the government is one of the highest
rates of funds. Implemented by several partners like IREX, USAID etc. Money poured
into this is more than what is necessary. Other projects are making more impact with less
funds. It’s ‘let’s have fun in a hotel and that's all’. It’s time to change the mentality of
wasting resources: how can you make a project without proper infrastructure ? (Kamel,
2022)
Respondents explain that going to these capacity building training is no longer as
beneficent as the early years of the revolution, even more there is a tendency for youth to join
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these activities just to benefit from the pension received and not for the real change. This results
in a system with no trust between the different stakeholders and going back to the old regime’s
tradition of having youth as decorative items which exacerbates the problem.
d. Depoliticization of youth
Afef’s experience with ‘3ish Tounsi’ was based on this perception too. She left her
position as a Project Manager in her region, Kasserine. In reflecting on some of the reasons why
she left the initiative despite it grappling a lot of attention, she highlighted:
Anyone joining a project like this knows that they will be joining a political group:
politicized. I left that job because they played a political game on me that didn’t
represent me. People who were against their personal affairs and mainly politicians.
They are very strong in the country, in my region, a thief represents me, imagine that!
They bribe, I can’t (Talbi, 2022)
The results of the interviews showed that respondents from the youth category were detaching
themselves from the political sphere and preferred being either volunteering or independently
working in CSOs that are not politically active. The deception received after the revolution from
the political layer and the public institutions led them to refute the political scene. Alexandre
from another perspective had a different response, he explained this :
CSOs work is controlled by heads before and after the revolution. More politically
oriented. The owners of organizations are like brand imaging. CSOs are not working,
and they are just collecting money (Maalel)
Respondents from youth explained how joining CSOs was merely linked to a social class
and had also a hierarchy inside its structures making it a mini representation of the public bodies.
Rather than creating a homogenous cercle, it was used as a propaganda tool. “Out of 25,000
registered CSOs in Tunisia, only 5000 are effectively active with a big part of them ending up
being politically affiliated” (Bouazizi, 2022).
Semah explained his investment to be involved in civic life and the need to invest certain
resources to unleash fully your potentials within CSOs and to be fully included. He carried on
describing his journey and his travels to attend the frequent meetings and to be just physically
present, all required him to be financially independent and that he couldn’t do that without
investing some of his financial resources, lack of means, or a certain social class. The social and
economic situation was a prominent factor highlighted by respondents for youth and making
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everything accessible to them is the key to have them included and empowered; to open the door
for them to actively participate in CSOs. Semah described :
I do work already. If I was unemployed, I would not waste 4 hours on a Saturday paying
from my own pocket to join certain meetings. My priority would be to save money for life.
(Abdeljabar, 2022)
Alexandre built equally on the same idea, adding the challenge of trust as well. The need
to have a safe space/ zone where youth can express themselves freely without control is needed
and if politics are added to the equation, it loses its credibility and red flags will be raised asking
for accountability as they are perceived as propaganda generators. Alexandre described his pure
neutrality and refuted from getting involved with anything related to politics.
e. ‘Our’ compared to ‘their’ discourses
Despite the feeling of satisfaction after serving and empowering local communities.
Respondents from youth who decided to leave the civic life through CSOs were hesitant and had
divergent opinions when it came to the idea of being active or engaged. Kamel was the winner of
the editions of ‘Sawt Alshabab Al Arabi’, one of the biggest debating competitions in the region
launched right after the revolution, ending his cycle of volunteering after being overwhelmed by
the system of imposed discourses with no real improvement. Some of the opportunities are using
youth and their potentials to realize their activities which do not necessarily align with the real
needs. He explains:
You feel you’re serving people and they go up and you remain there, at the bottom down.
In civil society work, there is egoism and greediness in sharing information. Now I have
become selective of opportunities too (Kamel, 2022)
Respondents were describing another sort of challenge when dealing with the community
of donors and the INGOs.The administrative and bureaucratic structure in them hinders their
improvement in level and capacity. On that Houssem reflects on his experience:
There was a problem in the system. I used to pay and never got my membership card
except for the first year. I left because they don’t work. It's just youth tourism as they go
to hotels. Even when I send them proposals, they ditch them as they have them set already
(Dridi, 2022)
Hamza was describing his experience as well regarding the attitude of degrading and
looking down from CSOs themselves which was linked as per the respondents to regionalism
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and social classes clashes. The lack of experience in youth’s profiles, along with low funds for
project implementation, increases the risk to INGOs and dooms youth as uninteresting calibers.
As explained in the literature, the insufficient knowledge and education disadvantages their
position which affects their possibility of becoming higher in ranking. Hamza explained: “ We
were just volunteering for them, like the social class structure, regional disparities” (Mahjoubi,
2022). These groups were classifying the members based on their social class, school, and
origins.
The role of youth as change agents is linked to the number of opportunities and their
qualities received. As youth is not a constant phase in life, their needs change as well. The need
to have a structure based and to not link it to people to create a process of delegation is important
as respondents were mentioning the saturation from the usual training and capacity building
programs given, aspiring for more ground-breaking approaches for creative thinking and
innovation to have independent youth bodies, aware, and actively engaged. Alexandre explained:
“We are not going to work under others, you will end up getting the leftovers and you need to
align with their thoughts even if they give you a good amount of money” (Maalel).
f. Gender roles
The interviews revealed new themes that were not crossed during the literature review
part. The series of interviews with different interviewees from different areas in Tunisia, social
class, and gender showed that there are also different perceptions and challenges specifically for
the female participants. Sana, mentioning this example describing the circumstances of some
girls while joining their trainings: “Some parents wouldn’t allow their female kids to join any of
our workshops as it was in another community. But the willingness was there, some female
participants brought their relatives with them to be able to join the workshops” (Guesmi, 2022).
Particularly female respondents mentioned the gender theme oppositely to the other respondents
from different categories. Challenges covering time management, social structures, and social
pressures were at the top of them. Female respondents were from different regions, social
classes, and jobs.
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V.3.1. Unemployment after activism
a. Stagnation: No representation, no more learning, no jobs
The first objective to joining civil society activities whether as an actively and civically
engaged youth or as part of an organization was to share, implement change, and to be heard.
Respondents were divided into two categories when it comes to their reason for joining civil
society. The first category stepped out or was ‘excluded’ from the civic work. The second
category is still attached to it but took different paths. Afef, late 20’s, taking her masters degree
in social and economic solidarity in the National Institute of Labor and Social studies (INTES).
She was a part of ‘I'm the President’ program with SFCG in the training and events management,
describing her experience of unemployment after and working with Tamkeen, a newly created
association that strengthens the fabric of support organizations for micro-entrepreneurs,
UNICEF, and others.
The attention given to youth who are active and benefited from capacity building
programs was little or even absent. This category of civically engaged youth were active actors
leading the change, implementing programs with donors, and have wide networks of supporters
and followers. public institutions and public youth mechanisms did not take advantage of that
and these youth are today divided as per the answers of respondents into two categories, either
unemployed youth who are no longer willing to participate in civic life nor to be engaged in any
form of empowerment and development. Or youth who managed to nail jobs with INGOs or
abroad and ultimately have a tendency to either leave the country or they have already left it.
This observation was mainly drawn from the answers of respondents who are living and/or from
areas outside the capital and the coast. Houssem described the employability rate in his area Sidi
Bouzid: “I’m unemployed, some other CSOs also were created after us taking the lead but we
were all unemployed” (Dhahri, 2022).
This finding aligns with what was mentioned in the previous sections. People are taking
opportunities not on a merit based using their networks. Each respondent at least was highliting a
similar incident where they did not get what they see is fair to them. work before, but now I’m
almost unemployed. civil society work did not prove its sustainability nor its fairness especially
in the last couple of years when it became a market where some NGOs assign and recruit with no
visiblity. On the other hand, the civil society works as much as it is not a long term commitment,
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there was a tremendous stagnation in the market pushing young people to seek abroad
opportunities.
b. Youth disenfranchisement: Education and Escape
Respondents were emphasizing on the importance of the global exchange experiences in
shaping their orientations and the way they express their activism. All respondents were part,
participated, or organized such youth exchange programs abroad and got the chance to join the
international community. They all initially brought back their expertise and knowledge to their
local communities whether as active independent change agents or within organizations.
Community needs are great motivators for respondents to carry on their work despite the
huge difference between the education received and their actual/current work which is mainly
with the nonprofit sector. As Asma explained: “This field helped me in my relationships with the
people, family, and community. You get more encouraged as you see the spirit increasing, we
started with only 5 people. Now we have more than 100 members and volunteers” (Attig, 2022).
They explained that the esteemed improvement was not implemented despite a lot of wait
and action. Both Hamza and Sarra are like many other youths who decided to leave the country.
When describing their experiences, they both no longer follow the political, social, nor economic
scenes and lost that excitement and enthusiasm they had in the beginning. Hamza describes:
Living in Hungry working and studying. I stopped working in anything related to civil
society. I had a burnout when I was 17 years old, schoolwork but also because I wanted
to change my region. I was very dedicated to putting all my efforts there. I left after that
immediately! Omg that’s 8 years ago, I feel old! (Mahjoubi, 2022)
The boom in civil society brought a new wave of job opportunities to the unemployed
youth. Imen as a previous employee in the Ministry of Youth explains how their work with
Search for Common ground INGO created more future opportunities whether as temporary jobs
or project based ones for youth who benefited from capacity building trainings:
These leaders that we trained are now CSOs and have funds from abroad. They are the
leaders of today and we know them by name, CSOs are their job now. Before it was only
volunteering, now it is a market and a job which is positive and negative (Belhedi, 2022)
For CSOs to be able to provide job opportunities they go through the cycle of applying to
funds and grants. Thus, as Rashed explained, the regulations are putting more and more
limitations on the external funds and thus cutting off the jobs that were just created in the past
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years. Being tied to civil society and to CSOs is not also considered as a strong commitment for
life. Respondents were identifying it only as a temporary stage in their lives. Dorra explained:
I need to move to my other stage in life, such small NGOs do not satisfy my curiosity
anymore. Now, at this stage of my career life, I need stability and need to leave and to
stop being civically engaged. I want to impact more people, but I didn’t find that fits my
vision (Arbia, 2022)
The sample took Tunisian youth who were involved in the uprising and/or who started
their involvement right after it. Results showed that all respondents took different paths for their
future. In between those who left the country for studying and work and those who left local civil
work and either tended to completely disconnect from the civic envolvment sphere or to only
volunteer in individual charitable actions in the area they are residing in. Respondents justified
their deviation after all the excitement to seek new learning opportunities and to escape what
they described as a dead block future.

V.3. Donors’ discourses
Civil society Organizations are key society component actors as they can target
marginalized populations and provide services that the State and the market cannot do. This is in
conformity with the “third sector” theory. On the other hand, civil society is a conscious society
as a democratic driving force: based on free assembly principles and civic engagement it
challenges authoritarian regimes and promotes democratic practices within society. Therefore,
civil society promotion programs rely on three components: capacity building, social service
provision, and policy dialogue. There is a general and recent trend among donors to favor the
policy dialogue component to the expense of service provision. This section and the following up
one will study the role of donors and then the perceptions of the CSOs on how this system
works.
a. Local needs and global narratives
For many interviewees, two types of patterns were channeled to CSOs from the
community of donors from a global perspective and a local one. For CSOs to maintain their
expenses. CSOs fall into the trap of accepting the needs of donors and working with them based
on their assessment of the needs. Only a few CSOs transform these needs- mandates to their
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local needs. On the other hand, when youth see what donors are giving them from free foodtransport. Despite the trials of various CSOs, respondents confirmed that there was no other
solution, either to accept the provided templates and tailored needs or to not benefit from any
advantages if you decide to do things different, from their own narratives. Receiving grants
means merely entering a process of bureaucratization or professionalization. Alexandre, who is
the co-founder of an art-oriented organization, said:
It's hard to get the gratitude of the American embassy and to receive any funds with them.
You need to show what you can really do, show your history etc. They will not accept
anything not aligning within their values, visions, different priorities, and contexts
(Maalel)
For Aymen the need for the donor’s support is also parallel with their visibility and trust.
You will be much more linked and included if you work with the big donors (Bouazizi, 2022).
Respondents have noted that the range of grants and provided financial streams are influencing
their work directions. Many of the CSOs had to lose many of their talented youth with losses due
to improper implementation of the projects, or unawareness of the local needs and felt
disintegrated. Respondents from CSOs highlighted the different level of power relations when
undertaking negotiations with donors. They outlined a certain discomfort in defending their
initiatives due to the lack of support from the local, public authorities. Weakening their position
and ending up following the discourse presented or labeled in groups. Rami is an expert in
Middle East democratic transition, an active agent in Egypt, and regionaly describes his
experience of being clustered to a certain group in one of the meetings with donors:
We discovered they know everything about us, and even with good predictions on what
I’lI do in the future. Once, one declared, I read your bio and background. So, we asked
them, how do they describe us to the others? In fact, 2 weeks before the meeting, they
were doing kind of day to day follow up on us. They were labeling us as radicals
although we said we are not. We felt sort of discriminated and already excluded (Rami,
2022)
All the interviewed experts recalled and emphasized on the role of local bargaining
power that should be there to shape those narratives. A new or alternate change in the culture of
innovations and alternative financing. Funds should not be our first source; nor the sole option
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available. For CSOs to keep their autonomy, they should negotiate. Receiving funds will narrow
their freedom and reduce your credibility.
Interviewees were skeptical about such the implemented and offered programs and
whether there is a governmental or donors’ initiative to prepare youth for leadership and
participation in civic life. Respondents highlighted the tendency of youth to participate in these
activities as part of ‘ Youth Tourism’. This concept flourished after 2011 where youth was
exposed to certain programs and they joined to benefit from the stipend, facilities, and support
they get from donors. Samir, a director in one of the municipalities, who is himself an active in
civil society, shared that during the application phase there was some skepticism towards
whether this program is really supported by the public institutions or not. And whether it will
hear their voices or not. He described:
What I do not appreciate in these capacity and youth empowerment programs is that they
think and act as if they are our guardians. Youth experience is different from youth now.
Youth think alone, just give them the equipment and the tools; you’ll see wonders. Youth
now are thinking differently, they no longer like the rounded tables and hotels (Samir,
2022)
Sana, a previous worker with Search for Common Ground explained the meeting the needs
versus what is offered. Her observation is from her field work in delivering trainings to youth in
coastal areas:”On the other side, the provided training is not fitting the local contexts” (Guesmi,
2022)
b. Alternative sources of funds and innovation
International donors are systemic actors endowed with structural powers: as most
national actors depend on them and their funding, whether government or civil society
organizations, they disseminate standards and practices in partner countries. The main impact of
donor funding to CSOs is the creation of a local economic market of the third sector or nonprofit sector, with the rapid creation of thousands of organizations aimed at receiving
international funding and implementing projects, which in many cases tend to substitute for state
projects or public services. This economic market is also a labor market. On the one hand, and in
theory, grants aim to give organizations the means to develop their initiatives. But in practice,
especially when grants become high, receiving grants means entering a process of
bureaucratization or professionalization, based on hiring and retaining professionals specialized
in fundraising and fund management.
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Answering the critical lack of funds and the other challenges faced, the very common
answer from the experts is to push CSOs towards innovation and alternative solutions. The need
for funds will always be there for CSOs to exist and for a big number of youths to work. As
described by Houssem, as the co-founder of an NGO in Sidi Bouzid and who never beneficiated
and made it to get funds: “The participation of youth changed when we received our last fund.
You cannot move a rock without a big truck, we needed the money” (Dhahri, 2022)’
c. No transparency - en vogue approach
During the interview with one of the INGOs, with a high reputation in implementing
projects and having intensive on groundwork, the project manager was describing their role in
the implementation which is similar for several INGOs and lately NGOs in Tunisia. These
entities receive external funds and grants through applications, embassies, and referral. The work
on the project starts and the CSOs component is usually recruited as a consultant because of their
knowledge of the local contexts. Mentioning one of the biggest projects by UNDP Tunisia local
bureau:
It was a UNDP project over five months only, creating hubs, camps, and councils.
Bringing together hard reached youth, media, ministries, to come up with initiatives and
policies. There were again CSOs mobilizing these youths. Youth to youth let projects.
There was no evaluation, we heard that this was elected as the best elected. We did our
internal evaluation, but we didn't hear anything from the other side (Hendrick, 2022)
In this process where the assessment part was lacking, several implementers end up being
excluded from the processes of receiving grants and funds. The respondent followed up
describing a typical training conducted by INGOs and donors:
The second phase: despite the thousands of evaluations done from donors, there are
CSOs who are not benefiting from grants, will not get access to information and cannot
compete with the big heads but are really the ones implementing the change. Now you
take a hard-to-reach youth, take him to a 5 stars hotel and tell him about poverty
reduction. What will this youth feel? Trust me anger and frustration (Belhedi, 2022)
Respondents from the INGOs and experts were mentioning the lack of coordination and
communication as internal challenges among the community of donors themselves. Happened
that the same youth joined the same project idea in different donors’ umbrellas. This lack of
coordination created a market for the donors and fractionated based on how close/ strong they
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are with the public institutions. As explained by Imen Belhadi from Search for Common Ground
Organization: “Now the donors who are’ friends of the government’ and they became as if they
are the right hand of the government. We will include CSOs just to fit in the international rules
and criteria, only for the sake of pictures “(Belhedi, 2022) This close relationship made their
relationship with the youth unstable as Imen followed up: “Donors are now the government, and
we know that the relationship between the government and the youth is unstable” (Belhedi,
2022).

V.4. CSOs and funds
The role of donors to CSOs in the MENA countries is very different according to the
countries and to the donors. Bilateral donors have a greater political agenda based on historical
relationships with country partners and competition relational among bilateral donors.
Multilateral donors such as the European Union (EU) are less political, while the most important
one, budget wise. In Tunisia post uprising, the primary source of funding as reported by the CSO
stakeholders surveyed indicate that the largest share of organizations are dependent on donations
from individuals and foreign funders. From 2014 to 2017, CSOs indicated that the income from
their primary income source largely remained the same (ICNL, BRD, Minneapolis, 2018).
Subsequently, one of the easiest legal ways that was opened up after the revolution to get access
to funds was to open an organization.
a. Lack of representation: Businessman of CSOs
Respondents as members of CSOs and NGOs were questioning their participation and
role in communicating their needs and wants through their active involvement in civil society
work. The actively engaged members that were interviewed as part of CSOs expressed their
disagreement with the long-term plans and structural directions of CSOs and subsequently felt
marginalized and unheard. One attribute also mentioned was the tendency of these organizations
to target more quantity over quality projects based on the fund received. As the experience
shared by Kamel who got selected to various extensive training opportunities from donors and
INGOs and who is now pursuing a full-time seasonal freelancing job as a trainer is providing
mentorship to organizations, he explained with hesitation:
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I was super active between 2019-2020. After that, I decided to stop. You just find yourself
working for others, they are growing up and you do not get anything. The maximum
would be a certificate. Why would I volunteer and use my money? (Kamel, 2022)
The lack of representation and evolution from the learning process, from the routine of
the same position and the same activities is also experienced by CSOs themselves vis a vis their
counterparts of donors and public institutions. Respondents who are active as part of CSOs
confirmed that they feel used for certain purposes as tools, but they do care mainly about the
change, so they accept the requirements and activities suggested just for the esteemed change.
These institutions do like to be at the center of the coverage and to take over all the credits.
Instead, a big part of the work was conducted and carried on by the CSOs themselves. As Kamel
described: “When the impact becomes only for pictures and showing, we can’t talk about a real
one. What is happening here is not an impact. This is actually one of our biggest challenges”
(Kamel, 2022).
Respondents were also aware of the selective and exclusive approaches rather than
inclusive and holistic ways used by CSOs in determining their participation, the level of
engagement, the degree of integration and funds information circulation in organizations. The
information about funds and the possibilities of getting grants is not communicated properly. The
beneficiaries from hard-to-reach communities from my sample respondents are from various
regions. Those located outside the capital expressed this extremely niche and competitive
market of grants for them compared to the other big and large NGOs. They had to compromise
and change their plans to benefit from some facilities which is not necessarily their wish. As
Alexandre explained: “It is hard to get money for the hard-to-reach communities. You find
grants that do not really fit our ideas and capacities” (Maalel). Members of Brotherhood Art
and from different other respondents from CSOs expressed their self-investment of resources to
carry out with their ideas and projects. Usually due to the lack of capacities and long term
strategies, they end up receiving small grants and barely funds enough for an event. This
clustered them in a small circle of operation. As Kamel put it shortly in a circular process: “The
end of the budget, the end of money, the end of the project” (Kamel, 2022).
Asma was elected as a board member with the local committee of the Red Croissant in
this year. In explaining the hierarchical divisions inside the same organization but the different
committees spread regionally to the local areas, she followed up:
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The structure is like a central committee, regional committee, and local committee.
Procedures to get money even from the central entity is complicated. And our central
committee is always lazy, not really encouraging us to reach out to them (Attig, 2022)
Respondents were labeling CSOs and those with big names, and know how to get these funds
they want to work on whoever they are interested in. Only two respondents mentioned the
importance of the private sector as donors and a more guaranteed option to use as backers better
than the instability and unsustainability when dealing with the larger international community of
donors. Mohammed explained:
Private sector in Tunisia is supporting a lot! They give a lot of funds; you need to know
how to approach them. Plus, any penny you invest in donations to NGOs will be reduced
with a certain formula from their taxes (Mohammed, 2022)
For many people there were pressing problems with working in CSOs and central
committees compared to when they work with the big committees. These central offices
depending on the regions also do have certain benefits that the local ones do not enjoy as
previously presented in the sections. The mapping exercise when reaching out whether to fund
donors or from local public institutions must be less hierarchical as the central committees are
the ones distributing the money and the local ones end up with small amounts or mostly nothing.
Houssem on the other hand explained this tendency of donors to handpick the CSOs based on
their members’ potentials and qualifications.
b. Real change agents
Donors rely heavily on CSOs for their work, this bilateral relationship is needed to be
able to have an onsite vision brought by local actors. Youth elements do already have established
networks, similar to CSOs working in mutual exchange. Projects and initiatives are implemented
with the collaboration of public institutions and youth centers. All parts are needed as strategic
partners, a lot of projects ended after a year or so, the funds are really limited. CSOs need to
develop ways to sustain shared learning sessions for sustainability.
This reliance from the community of donors on CSOs came with its criterions and
matrices. Responding to the question of how they see the change. They were reluctant and yet
emphasizing on the different needs and views of requests from the donors causing pressure, and
lack of sustainability as funds are limited and tied to various criteria causing turbulent
relationships based on power balance. As Oussama argued that CSOs do not get enough
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resources and end up accepting what is offered to them without the power to negotiate. He
described :
No sustainability, CSOs are run by donors and cannot function without them. Now with
the new laws less funds are available. Public donors are useless, very small
contributions. donors impose rules, themes on you. Making you accept what they want in
a very indirect way. If you’re not on the same line, they will dispatch you simply. They
even block you in a list, so no sponsor approaches you at all (Dhahri, 2022)
c. Income generator and political agendas
Even though it is assumed after the uprising that the problem in civil society is the lack of
funds and of technical expertise. Interviewees explained that there are a set of required skills
needed for youth to be skillful and knowledgeable for an effective participation process in the
public sphere and decision- making processes which they do not necessarily have. Youth should
receive training on curriculums of debating, negotiations and introduction to public policies and
political awareness as what are elections and how to participate. In addition to improving critical
thinking and analysis skills in order to enable youth to analyze social, economic and political
challenges and provide innovative and creative solutions.
Interviewees revealed other challenges and were explaining other problems with CSOs
themselves and the nature of the programs implemented and of the delivered capacity building
training. Factors such as exclusion, no visibility and enough reporting were always present for
most respondents. As Afef, a previous project manager with donors and with CSOs explained:
The problem with civil society in Tunisian is society first. We saw a lot of CSOs booming,
and youth were eager to work. Now they are making money from these donors without
tractility, even inclusion is not a real one, and politics is usually there (Talbi, 2022)
Contrary to the narrative of Search for Common Ground, as an INGO, a receiver, and a
distributor of funds, in their program ‘I’m the president’, they have asked all their participants to
postpone and or to resign from any of their current political and public institutional affiliations.
This is a measure imposed to avoid political propaganda as it happened in other programs. As
Imen explained the sensitivity of their program and how these trained youth ended up joining
political parties willingly: “During the final episodes a lot of political parties wanted to get the
candidates contacts some of them ended up joining some political parties” (Belhedi, 2022).
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Respondents who were representing CSOs not benefitting from the community of
donor’s support mentioned the public money and funds they get from their local municipalities
and houses of youth. These funds were very limited and did not cover any expenses. This is in
addition to the rough process of getting them and the need to have municipalities and local
authorities approvals. As explained by Oussema: “The municipality is not doing what’s needed
morally, financially, or at any level but still the municipality is needed. They only do that a bit
only if you know someone there” (Dhahri, 2022).
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Chapter VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
a. Conclusion

Youth who used to be seen as the problem before the Tunisian uprising, were the ones
leading the revolution in the Tunisian streets and inspiring other peers to speak up, act, and to
revolt. Hence overthrowing a regime of 50 years of oppression and tyranny is different than
ousting one person or a whole family. Witnessing closely the uprising in Tunisia made the issue
so poignant to me personally. In this research, I used a threefold theoretical framework to look at
the apparent challenging position of youth themselves and to transmit their needs and to the role
of CSOs in containing those aspirations. The analysis leaned more towards contrasting the early
and the recent phases of the transitional period being the most insightful in the youth’s
experience. The ever- changing circumstances and political transformations not only affected the
stream of the analysis but also nuanced the understanding and perceptions of previous stances.
In this thesis, to understand the role of CSOs in the empowerment of youth, it is
indispensable to analyze public institutions’ role and the development agencies as an integral
part of the study. I interviewed 30 young men and women twice in between Tunisia, Egypt, and
abroad. Coupled with analyzing extensively the reports, articles, social media posts of activists,
and reports from the different stakeholders after and during the revolution time and to a closer
date to today gave me the holistic vision.
In chapter two, I looked to specify the youth and CSOs perception vis a vis their situation
in the country and to public institutions. The investigation showed clearly that the systematic
oppression and practices of the state since the Ben Ali regime have harmed the perception of
youth today. The economic, political, and social changes in Tunisia that followed the uprising
are just one challenge that youth are facing today. Eleven years after the Revolution were
followed by eleven major governmental changes. This political instability caused mixed feelings
for Tunisians, to question themselves and to wonder how far these progress activities have come.
The feeling was that the revolution was just stolen from them, or was a fictive illusion. This in
turn resulted in youth escaping reality through drugs, immigration, and religious extremism.
Almost no single approach was implemented to contain these youth and they were from the ones
calling for life, dignity, and employment to escaping the country that they sacrificed to see it free
from authoritarian practices.
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In the following chapter, the analyses break down the existing relationships. By detailing
the bi- lateral links between the different intervenients in the ecosystem.
Youth perceived CSOs as reconnecters of the relationship between the citizens, the state,
and the society during the transitional period reducing the potential for renewed conflict. Today,
CSOs themselves are also facing a fluctuating relationship and turbulent accusations with youth
who assured them their trust and the full responsibility to deliver their needs. The young in
Tunisia during the past view years have realized that bringing about change is a very delicate
issue. The research showed that, it is not necessarily the inexperience of the youth that puts a
challenge to implement development reforms, but rather the stagnant ideas of the older
generations, external security threats, and structural divisions that puts a challenge to the role
CSOs can play now in Tunisia. These youth ended up relying on civil society groups to translate
their meanings and to guard their back.
The tiredness and hopelessness of young Tunisians merged with the will to have a
concrete change in their local communities allowed them to give their trust to these civil groups
to carry on with the conversations with the respective public institutions. Majorly with the
community of donors who shifted drastically its practices and discourses since the revolution
back 2011. A shift from CSOs being a refuge for networking and creating local change to
depolarization, division with no strong translative body, and corruption. On the other hand,
CSOs constituted a second job market to so many active Tunisian youth and provided income
generating opportunities. The case now is tricky as a lot of CSOs are shutting down and leaving
the scene due to the lack of funds and the minimal sustainability and scalability schemes.
In section four and five, there will be an analysis of the community of donors’ discourses.
I attempt to analyze the global narratives and their linkages to the local Tunisian ecosystem.
While the current bottom-up approach, was better conceived, of the latter where the approach
was up-down, it is still arguably excluding and not holistic in needs assessment. Consequently, to
that, certain CSOs in the non-focal point regions were excluded and could not benefit from funds
nor visibility. The other scenario with the absence of any political alternative, they ended up
merging in the political scene to prove themselves and to remain alive in the scene.
Finally, this study is one more effort at understanding the role of CSOs in the
empowerment of youth and to have their needs better served, and how progress activities can
better meet the requests of youth during this period in the history of the region and under this
international structural guidance. Whether to take the approach of change through politics, or
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through including youth in social activities, none of them were successful and youth were
refuting and refusing even more being politically engaged, or socially committed.
In analyzing the findings with regards to studying the role of CSOs in youth inclusion
reforms under the community of donors’ guidance. Also investigating the challenges and the
experiences of the different stakeholders of the issue such as Youth Centers, Ministry of Youth,
active CSOs, donors such as USAID, implementers of donor’s programs such as Search for
Common Ground, and actively engaged youth. We can conclude the following:
-

At the government level, there were several movements to include youth in the reforms
process with emancipation programs. Thus, the question of youth involvement as an
enabling factor towards a more inclusive and empowered society. Challenges on the top
of them are lack of trust, bureaucracy, innovatio , communication, and coordination are
on the top.

-

On the local level with youth centers and local municipalities, centralization and
localization of resources revealed more challenges.

-

Civil society had a lot of contribution in pushing public entities to adopt various
structural adjustments serving the public interest. Also, reconnected the relationship
between the citizens, the state, and the society in a transitional period, supporting political
settlements and reducing the potential for renewed conflict. Today, CSOs themselves are
also facing a fluctuating relationship and turbulent accusations with youth who assured
them their trust and the full responsibility to deliver their needs.

-

No united requests or body from the CSOs assuring the communication and translating
the meanings from and to youth and institutions. This weakens the power structure that
they do exerce.

-

Activities and the implemented programs funded by the donors merely meets the local
needs. These funds are reduced putting on the challenge of self-reliance from CSOs and
grant hunters. It’s a pressing challenge as many youths are having CSOs involvement as a
source of income through such projects.
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b. Recommendations
According to the findings and drawing on the analyses for a more effective role of CSOs
towards a better inclusion of youth and their aspirations in the reforms. I will try to propose a set
of recommendations following the needs and data collected. The recommendations seek the
concept of institutionalization, which means that the inclusion of youth aspirations becomes part
of the system and a sustainable process, not just related to individual efforts.
Firstly, the recommendations will make sure to involve all community sectors and layers
concerned with youth issues and identify a role for each component. Based on the research
outcomes, the stakeholders identified cover a wide range of civically engaged youth, CSOs, and
INGOs whom – in some cases- constitute a liaison between the development partners. In
addition to the government- refereeing to youth concerned public institutions and to the private
sector equally. Recommendations will be drawn on two levels: Firstly, on the organizational side
and second on the implementation’s framework:
● First on the organizational level:
-

It would be more holistic and inclusive to have a representation and a recognition of the
views and aspirations of the youth.

-

Translation those aspirations requires a better communication scheme where all parties
are represented and included.

-

It should establish direct youth bodies in direct communication with the youth center and
public institutions. This will be an open space for youth where whenever they can
channel their needs and they are taken into consideration.

-

It should have more ‘supervisory’control on CSOs and their work while reinforcing the
ties with the bottom down layer and the local communities for more involvement.

-

The introduction of a collaborative body with CSOs and active youth to build a stronger
mapping system and a network of local active actors for support.

● The implementation mechanisms:
This is the core mechanism to implement the institutional reforms. The literature review showed
a great degree of cooperation and communication. public institutions mobilizers of provisions
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were proved to a certain degree; however, challenges were spotted on the implementation and
the enforcement levels:
-

To be inclusive after consulting with youth and CSOs representatives. By having more
partnerships with local active organizations and better schemes for dialogue facilitating
the communication of needs.

-

To boost the trust between the different stakeholders through well studied projects and
more involvement and commitment of youth tackling their real needs.

-

The openness to new, innovative approaches to raise funds and to implement the projects
and initiatives for better scalability and sustainability.

-

More assistance and better performance for bureaucrats where youth can take a share in
the introduction of new technology and tech projects.

-

It should clearly reinforce the security and track the funds with adequate auditing tools
not in the form of more rigid processes but in follow ups, mentoring, and assessment.

-

It should clearly state who is responsible for the coordination of the overall policy
or plan.

Lastly, this thesis is an attempt at diagnosis, more efforts should be exerted to translate these
findings and results into practical solutions. The paper focused on the unsteady depoliticization
and disenfranchisement of youth and on their experience of civil society engagement as well.
My hope is that this work and the similar few ones conducted by youth themselves open more
opportunities not only to discussion but to effectively implement and act. Re-evaluation the
revolutionary experience – better late than never is possible. As for scholars, political actors,
policy makers and development partners, it is equally an important opportunity to revisit some of
their approach and some of their assumptions regarding their relationship with youth.
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Appendix A: Interview Questions

Interview Guiding Questions
CSOs- English
What is the role of civil society Organisations in Youth Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising
Tunisia?
The purpose of this research topic is to explore the role of civil society Organisations in Youth
Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising Tunisia. It will try to develop a better understanding of the
mechanisms by which active groups are moving and stimulating the political sphere.
*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Main context: Participants talk about their experience in civil society activities, and questions
will be asked when only further clarification was needed.
1/ Please give a general background About your CSO: Background, previous social and
political engagements, work previous and social)
2/ Describe your social work activism/ involvement ( when it started, When did it start, any
particular reason, did you have a specific post, did that have an impact on your family,
community, what was the process of collaboration)
3/ Please describe how did you see the impact (who got involved, your experience in
general)
4/ What does it mean to you to be socially active ( How do you see the situation in Tunisia
before & after the revolution)?
5/ Do you feel your voice was heard, impactful ( please describe)
6/ Have you encountered any difficulties, problems of any kind in your activism related to
public and Youth reform (responsiveness)?
7/ Have you worked with other CSOs? How was that cooperation? Was your work on the
local and/or the national levels?
8/ Please describe your previous work - if any with donors?
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Interview Guiding Questions
Experts English
What is the role of civil society organizations in Youth Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising
Tunisia?
The purpose of this research topic is to explore the role of civil society organization’s in Youth
Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising Tunisia. It will try to develop a better understanding of the
mechanisms by which active groups are moving and stimulating the political sphere.
*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Main context: Participants talk about their experience in civil society activities, and questions
will be asked when only further clarification was needed.
1/ Please give a general background About yourself: Academic, background, previous
social and political engagements, work previous and social)
2/ How do you interpret the role of donors’ community in the MENA, about any specific
approaches and the types of programs implemented?
3/ Please describe how did you see the impact (who got involved, your analysis of the
situation in general)
4/ What does it mean to you to be the recipient of donations/ grants for CSOs (How do you
see the situation in Tunisia before & after the revolution)?
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Interview Guiding Questions
Youth Groups
What is the role of civil society organizations in Youth Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising
Tunisia?
The purpose of this research topic is to explore the role of civil society organizations in Youth
Inclusion Reforms Post-Uprising Tunisia. It will try to develop a better understanding of the
mechanisms by which active groups are moving and stimulating the political sphere.
*Participation in this study is voluntary. Refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. You may discontinue participation at any time
without penalty or the loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
Main context: Participants talk about their experience in civil society activities, and questions
will be asked when only further clarification was needed.
1/ Please give a general background About yourself: Academic, background, previous
social and political engagements, work previous and social)
2/ Describe your social work activism/ involvement (when it started, when did it start, any
particular reason, did you have a specific post, did that have an impact on your family,
community, what was the process of collaboration)
3/ Please describe how did you see the impact (who got involved, your experience in
general)
4/ What does it mean to you to be socially active (How do you see the situation in Tunisia
before & after the revolution)?
5/ Do you feel your voice was heard, impactful (please describe)
6/ Have you encountered any difficulties, problems of any kind in your activism related to
public and Youth reform (responsiveness)?
7/ Have you worked with other CSOs? How was that cooperation? Was your work on the
local and/or the national levels?

86

